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I. INTRODUCTION
Denazification—whether defined narrowly as a political purge or more broadly
as an attempt to change the values of post-Nazi society—has not enjoyed a
good press.1 In the case of Austria, as in the two German “successor societies”
of the Third Reich, criticism has divided roughly into a conservative and a
“left-liberal” position. The former has weighed denazification in the balance
against Western legal principles (notably the prohibition of “retroactivity” and
collective punishment) and found it wanting.2 Dieter Stiefel’s 1981 study (still
the only monograph on Austrian denazification) is clearly in this tradition,
though its juridical concerns are overlaid by two further considerations, sov-
ereignty and the rationality of integration.3 Taken together, these three factors
make denazification appear to Stiefel not merely as a legally dubious project
but also as an unwarranted and often inept Allied interference in Austrian
society. It sought to deny the inevitable reintegration of the mass of Nazi Party
members (in Austria amounting to nearly seven hundred thousand people) but
could only delay it.4
* I would like to thank the British Academy (Elisabeth Barker Fund) for supporting
the research for this article and the two anonymous JMH reviewers for their constructive
criticism. I wish to dedicate this article to the memory of Elisabeth Barker.
1 For historiography, see the classic work by Lutz Niethammer, Entnazifizierung in
Bayern: Sa¨uberung und Rehabilitierung unter amerikanischer Besatzung (Frankfurt
am Main, 1972), 11–24; and, more recently, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, “Die Trennung
vom Nationalsozialismus: Selbstzersto¨rung, politische Sa¨uberung, ‘Entnazifizierung,’
Strafverfolgung,” in Politische Sa¨uberung in Europa: Die Abrechnung mit Faschismus
und Kollaboration nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Hans
Woller (Munich, 1991), 32–66; Clemens Vollnhals, ed., Entnazifizierung: Politische
Sa¨uberung und Rehabilitierung in den vier Besatzungszonen, 1945–1949 (Munich,
1991), 7–64; Peter Reichel, Vergangenheitsbewa¨ltigung in Deutschland: Die Ausein-
andersetzung mit der NS-Diktatur von 1945 bis heute (Munich, 2001), 30–37.
2 Theodor Veiter, Gesetz als Unrecht: Die o¨sterreichische Nationalsozialistengesetz-
gebung (Vienna, 1949); for Germany see Julius Fu¨rstenau, Entnazifizierung (Berlin,
1969).
3 Dieter Stiefel, Entnazifizierung in O¨ sterreich (Vienna, 1981).
4 Ibid., 93 (table), 293–97. See also Manfried Rauchensteiner, Die Zwei: Die Große
Koalition in O¨ sterreich, 1945–1966 (Vienna, 1987), 91–93; Hugo Portisch and Sepp
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Perhaps the main problem with this conservative position is its implication
that traditional legal instruments were adequate to deal with the legacy of
National Socialism in the actual circumstances of postwar Germany or Austria.
This in turn rests on the assumption that by the end of the war Austrian society
had undergone a profound educative process, which understates the involve-
ment (to varying degrees of criminal culpability) of significant parts of Aus-
trian society in Nazi rule.5 In the end this position sees the basic problem not
as National Socialism but as denazification, a delusive process that somehow
had to be got through before society could begin to function again. The victims
of National Socialism too are displaced in this perspective by the objects of
denazification, personified by the figure of the “small,” misled “party comrade”
(Parteigenosser).6
The “left-liberal” critique of denazification emerged in the 1960s as part of
the New Left claim that an opportunity had been missed—that of establishing
grassroots democracy in the ruins of the Third Reich. The anti-Communism
of the Western occupation authorities, particularly that of the U.S. military, it
was argued, had led them to stifle spontaneous, antifascist impulses “from
below.”7 However, the evidence for these impulses is thin for West Germany,
where this claim was first advanced. It is equally thin for Austria, where such
antifascist groups as did emerge at the end of the war (for example, the “O5”
resistance group) were quickly absorbed into the three political parties that
were (re)constituted (as “antifascist”) in April 1945: the Socialist Party (SPO¨ ),
the People’s Party (O¨ VP), and the Communist Party (KPO¨ ). Under those cir-
Riff, O¨ sterreich II: Der Lange Weg zur Freiheit: Die Wiedergeburt unseres Staates
(Vienna, 1986), 56–83. For party membership figures (up to March 1943), see Gerhard
Jagschitz, “Von der ‘Bewegung’ zum Apparat: Zur Pha¨nomenologie der NSDAP im
Dritten Reich, 1938–1945,” in NS-Herrschaft in O¨ sterreich: Ein Handbuch, ed. Em-
merich Ta´los, Ernst Hanisch, and Wolfgang Neugebauer (Vienna, 2000), 88–122, 109.
5 For a recent overview see Evan Bukey, Hitler’s Austria: Popular Sentiment in the
Nazi Era, 1938–1945 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000).
6 Stiefel, Entnazifizierung, 328–32; see also Dieter Stiefel, “Der Prozeß der Entna-
zifizierung in O¨ sterreich,” in Henke and Woller, Politische Sa¨uberung in Europa, 146.
Empathy with the “victims” of denazification is even more evident in Lothar Ho¨belt,
Von der vierten Partei zur Dritten Kraft: Die Geschichte des VdU (Graz, 1999); for
detailed criticism see Robert Knight, “The Austrian State Treaty and Beyond,” Con-
temporary European History 10 (2001): 132–38.
7 Lutz Niethammer, Ulrich Borsdorf, and Peter Brandt, eds., Arbeiterinitiative, 1945:
Antifaschistische Ausschu¨sse und Reorganisation der Arbeiterbewegung in Deutsch-
land (Wuppertal, 1976); see also Rebecca Boehling, “U.S. Military Occupation, Grass
Roots Democracy, and Local German Government,” in American Policy towards Ger-
many, 1945–1955, ed. Jeff Diefendorf, Axel Frohn, and Hermann-Josef Rupieper
(Cambridge, 1993), 281–306.
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cumstances the claim that an antifascist opportunity was stifled by the (West-
ern) Allies has been hard to sustain.8
Nevertheless, a wider left-liberal criticism of the reconstitution of the
Austrian republic has gathered momentum in the last two decades, with the
“Waldheim Affair” and the rise of Jo¨rg Haider acting as catalysts if not trig-
gers.9 There is now a considerable literature that emphasizes the continuities
of popular prejudice (notably antisemitism), is deeply skeptical of earlier
claims about national resistance and collective victimhood, and stresses post-
war Austrian evasions.10 Some of this literature has been criticized as moralistic
and self-righteous or condemned as unhistorical in that it judges the postwar
8 See, among others, Robert Knight, “Britische Entnazifizierungpolitik,” Zeitgeschi-
chte 11 (1984): 287–301; Oliver Rathkolb, “US-Entnazifizierung in O¨ sterreich
zwischen kontrollierter Revolution und Elitenrestauration (1945–1949),” Zeitgeschi-
chte 11 (1984): 302–25; Sebastian Meissl, Klaus-Dieter Mulley, and Oliver Rathkolb,
eds., Verdra¨ngte Schuld—Verfehlte Su¨hne: Entnazifizierung in O¨ sterreich, 1945–1955
(Vienna, 1986); Winfried R. Garscha and Claudia Kuretsidis-Haider, Die Nachkriegs-
justiz als nicht-bu¨rokratische Form der Entnazifizierung: O¨ sterreichische Justizakten
im europa¨ischen Vergleich (Vienna, 1995), 18–22; Winfried Garscha, “Entnazifizierung
und gerichtliche Ahndung von NS-Verbrechen,” in Ta´los et al., NS-Herrschaft in O¨ ster-
reich, 852–83; Brigitte Bailer-Galanda and Winfried Garscha, “Der o¨sterreichische
Staatsvertrag und die Entnazifizierung,” in Der o¨sterreichische Staatsvertrag, 1955:
Internationale Strategie, rechtliche Relevanz, nationale Identita¨t/The Austrian State
Treaty, 1955: International Strategy, National Identity, ed. Arnold Suppan, Gerald
Stourzh, and Wolfgang Mueller (Vienna, 2005), 629–54; see also Hubert Feichtlbauer’s
journalistic account, Der Fall O¨ sterreich: Nationalsozialismus, Rassismus; eine not-
wendige Bilanz (Vienna, 2000), 122–33.
9 See Gerhard Sprengnagel and Gerhard Botz, eds., Kontroversen um O¨ sterreichs
Zeitgeschichte: Verdra¨ngte Vergangenheit, O¨ sterreich-Identita¨t und die Historiker
(New York, 1994); Heidemarie Uhl, “Zeitgeschichtsforschung und ‘o¨sterreichisches
Geda¨chtnis,’” Zeitgeschichte 30 (2003): 341–56; Ingrid Bauer, “Kontinuita¨taten und
Transformation: Die o¨sterreichische Zeitgeschichtsforschung im Generationenver-
gleich,” Zeitgeschichte 30 (2003): 320–40.
10 See, among others, Walter Manoschek, “Verschma¨hte Erbschaft: O¨ sterreichs Um-
gang mit dem Nationalsozialismus, 1945 bis 1955,” in O¨ sterreich, 1945–1995, ed.
Reinhard Sieder, Heinz Steinert, and Emmerich Ta´los (Vienna, 1995), 94–106; Ulf
Brunnbauer, ed., Eiszeit der Erinnerung: Vom Vergessen der eigenen Schuld (Vienna,
1999); Peter Utgaard, Remembering and Forgetting Nazism: Education, National Iden-
tity, and the Victim Myth in Postwar Austria (New York, 2003); Walter Schuster and
Wolfgang Weber, eds., Entnazifizierung im regionalen Vergleich, Archiv der Stadt Linz
(Linz, 2004); Ernst Hanisch, Der Lange Schatten des Staates: O¨ sterreichische Ge-
schichte, 1890–1990 (Vienna, 1994), 420–25; Klaus Eisterer, “O¨ sterreich unter Al-
liierter Besatzung,” in O¨ sterreich im 20. Jahrhundert: Vom Zweiten Weltkrieg bis zur
Gegenwart, ed. Rolf Steininger and Michael Gehler, vol. 2 (Vienna, 1997), 147–87,
esp. 168–77; Martin F. Polaschek, Im Namen der Republik O¨ sterreich! Die Volksge-
richte in der Steiermark, 1945 bis 1955, Vero¨ffentlichungen des Steierma¨rkischen Lan-
desarchives, vol. 23 (Graz, 1998);
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generation by the standards of a later one, instead of trying to understand it.11
Whether or not this criticism is valid in particular cases will depend on how
“moralistic” is defined (it rarely is), but recent discussions suggest, if anything,
a retreat from finger-pointing.12 One reason may be that a focus on the struc-
tural or mental continuities of Austrian society raises the difficult question of
how a “society of perpetrators” (Ta¨tergesellschaft) could ever have been ex-
pected to instigate a “self-cleansing.”13 And if it could not, what grounds are
there for criticism?
This question of how a society can pull itself up by its own moral bootstraps
takes us back to a famous argument made by Hermann Lu¨bbe over twenty
years ago. According to Lu¨bbe, West German society had not repressed its
complicity in National Socialism but rather had exercised a functionally nec-
essary “communicative silence.” By conforming outwardly to democratic
norms the generation that had followed Hitler made any relapse impossible
and took the first step toward genuine democracy.14 Lu¨bbe’s argument was
directed against Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich’s diagnosis of West
German society as one “incapable of mourning” and against their prescription
of “working through” guilt and trauma. However, the Mitscherlichs’ stress on
the psychological costs of repression has been taken up more recently by
Gesine Schwan, who argues that Lu¨bbe’s external conformity falls short of
what familial and social relations in a democracy require.15 For her it is the
cost of repression that matters.
11 For example, Gabriele Holzer, Verfreundete Nachbarn: O¨ sterreich—Deutschland
ein Verha¨ltnis (Vienna, 1995), 33–44; Rudolf Burger, “Irrtu¨mer der Gedenkpolitik: Ein
Pla¨doyer fu¨r das Vergessen,” Europa¨ischer Rundschau 29, no. 2 (2001): 3–13.
12 For example, Anton Pelinka, Out of the Shadow of the Past, Nations of the Modern
World (Oxford, 1998), combines both “functionalist” and moral arguments. Oliver
Rathkolb, Die paradoxe Republik: O¨ sterreich, 1945 bis 2005 (Vienna, 2005), stresses
the continuities of popular prejudice, 392–405; Maria Mesner, ed., Entnazifizierung
zwischen politischem Anspruch und Kaltem Krieg: Das Beispiel der SPO¨ (Vienna,
2005), is concerned with the circumstances and costs of reintegration within the SPO¨ .
13 Martin Horvath, Anton Legerer, Judith Pfeifer, Stephan Roth, eds., Jenseits des
Schlussstrichs: Gedenkdienst im Diskurs u¨ber O¨ sterreichs nationalsozialistische Ver-
gangenheit (Vienna, 2002), 22–33.
14 Hermann Lu¨bbe, “Der Nationalsozialismus im politischen Bewußtsein der Gegen-
wart,” in Deutschlands Weg in die Diktatur: Internationale Konferenz zur nationalso-
zialistischen Machtu¨bernahme, ed. Martin Broszat et al. (Berlin, 1983), 329–49.
15 Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, Die Unfa¨higkeit zu trauern: Grundlagen
kollektiven Verhaltens (Munich, 1977); Gesine Schwan, Politics and Guilt: The De-
structive Power of Silence, trans. Thomas Dunlop (London, 1997)/Politik und Schuld:
Die zersto¨rerische Macht des Schweigens (Frankfurt am Main, 1997), esp. 54–99, 134–
44, 177–79 [English ed.]; for Austria see Felix de Mendelssohn, “Psychoanalyse als
Aufkla¨rung,” in Das Grosse Tabu: O¨ sterreichs Umgang mit seiner Vergangenheit, ed.
Anton Pelinka and Erika Weinzierl (Vienna, 1987), 42–59.
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Helmut Dubiel has applied these arguments in his study of the debates of
the German Bundestag. At first sight his position appears diametrically op-
posed to Lu¨bbe’s.16 He sees self-critical scrutiny of guilt as an essential re-
quirement for creating a democratic culture, and he finds its absence in the
Bundestag debates of the 1950s repugnant, even baffling. The democracy that
emerged in the 1960s was “only an institutional skeleton” that remained to be
fleshed out. Nevertheless, his inability to imagine an alternative scenario and
his conclusion that the necessary culture of reflection had to grow “in long
and very complex civilizing processes” are in the end not as far from Lu¨bbe
as might be expected.17
For the historian all this suggests that the issue is not whether the integration
of most former Nazis in post-Nazi society was inevitable. In some sense it
clearly was. What matters more is the kind of integration that took place and
the quality of the democratic culture that emerged as a result.18 Dubiel makes
much here of the West German (forced) acceptance of the legal succession to
the Third Reich. Put simply, West Germany’s elites had nowhere to run. By
contrast, the designation of Austria as “the first victim of Hitlerite aggression”
(in the words of the 1943 “Moscow Declaration”) gave Austria an escape route.
Dubiel follows here the famous distinction made by the German sociologist
M. Rainer Lepsius, who argued that while West Germany “internalized” its
complicity and the German Democratic Republic “universalized” it, Austria
was able to “externalize” it—that is, off-load it onto Berlin, thus evading
discussion or critical reflection.19 Lepsius’s brilliant analysis has been deserv-
edly influential, but it also risks being misunderstood in two contrasting senses.
On the one hand, it can encourage the cliche´ that Austrian evasions were the
product of a particularly opportunistic or cynical national character. On the
other, it can degenerate into a rather crude “realist” argument that the Austrian
state acted no differently from other states in taking the “escape route” offered
by the Moscow Declaration. Any other course would have been irrational.20
16 Helmut Dubiel, Niemand ist frei von der Geschichte: Die nationalsozialistische
Herrschaft in den Debatten des Deutschen Bundestages (Vienna, 1999).
17 Ibid., 76, 289. For a similar though more positive discussion see Anne Sa’adah,
Germany’s Second Chance: Trust, Justice, and Democratization (Cambridge, MA,
1998), 135–42.
18 Wolfgang Neugebauer and Peter Schwarz, Der Wille zum aufrechten Gang: Of-
fenlegung der Rolle des BSA (Bund sozialdemokratischer AkademikerInnen, Intellek-
tueller und Ku¨nstlerInnen) bei der gesellschaftlichen Reintegration ehemaliger Nation-
alsozialisten (Vienna, 2005).
19 M. Rainer Lepsius, “Das Erbe des Nationalsozialismus und die politische Kultur
der Nachfolgestaaten des ‘Großdeutschen Reiches,’” in his Demokratie in Deutschland:
Soziologisch-historische Konstellationsanalysen; Ausgewa¨hlte Aufsa¨tze (Go¨ttingen,
1993), 229–45: see Heidemarie Uhl, “Zeitgeschichtsforschung und ‘o¨sterreichisches
Geda¨chtnis,’” Zeitgeschichte 30 (2003): 341–56.
20 For example, Michael Gehler, ed., Karl Gruber: Reden und Dokumente, 1945–
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In both cases, overstressing collective issues—“character” in the first, ration-
ality in the second—diverts attention from an analysis of the premises, goals,
and resources of the various actors involved and from their interactions.
This article attempts such an analysis by examining denazification in the
southern Austrian province of Carinthia. Questions about Carinthia’s demo-
cratic culture were raised sporadically after the war but have only reemerged
since the electoral successes of Jo¨rg Haider, who, despite recent setbacks na-
tionally, remains governor of the province (at the time of writing). Part of the
Carinthian electorate appears ready to overlook his defense of aspects of the
Third Reich and his praise for those who fought for it in the Waffen-SS and
elsewhere.21 Some see this as evidence that the province comes “from another
galaxy.”22 Others within the provincial establishment have defended the prov-
ince against the accusation that it is especially “brown.”23 Historical investi-
gations of denazification in Carinthia have tended to adopt a provincial focus,
seeing this as one of the many problems that beset the province, sometimes
implying that Carinthia would have been better off left to its own devices.24
More critical studies, notably those of Alfred Elste and Dirk Ha¨nisch,
1953: Eine Auswahl (Vienna, 1994), 18; Gerald Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit:
Staatsvertrag, Neutralita¨t und das Ende der Ost-West-Besetzung O¨ sterreichs, 1945–
1955 (Vienna, 1998), 20–28.
21 See, among others, Ruth Wodak and Anton Pelinka, eds., The Haider Phenomenon
in Austria (New Brunswick, NJ, 2002), 95–119. For a defense (in my view uncon-
vincing) of Haider’s comments, see Lothar Ho¨belt, Defiant Populist: Jo¨rg Haider and
the Politics of Austria (West Lafayette, IN, 2003), 34–37.
22
“SPO¨ hilft Haider ins Amt,” Der Spiegel, March 13, 2004.
23 Claudia Fra¨ss-Ehrfeld, “Das Ka¨rntner Landesbewusstsein,” in Ka¨rnten: von der
deutschen Grenzmark zum o¨sterreichischen Bundesland, ed. Helmut Rumpler (with
assistance of Ulfried Burz), Geschichte der o¨sterreichischen Bundesla¨nder seit 1945,
vol. 6 (Vienna, 1998), 777–801; see also Claudia Fra¨ss-Ehrfeld, “Zwischen Bundes-
kompetenz und Ka¨rntner Realita¨t: Die Ka¨rntner Minderheitenproblematik in der Zwei-
ten Republik, 1945–1976,” in Ka¨rnten und Wien: Zwischen Staatsidee und Landes-
bewusstsein, ed. Claudia Fra¨ss-Ehrfeld and Helmut Rumpler, Ka¨rnten und die Nationale
Frage, vol. 4 (Vienna, 2005), 83–162.
24 Wilhelm Wadl, “Entnazifizierung in Ka¨rnten,” in Schuster and Weber, Entnazifi-
zierung, 251–66; August Walzl, Ka¨rnten 1945: Vom NS-Regime zur Besatzungsherr-
schaft im Alpen-Adria-Raum (Klagenfurt, 1985), and Die Bewa¨ltigung: Nachkriegsjahre
in Ka¨rnten und Friaul (Klagenfurt, 1999), 198–209; Wilhelm Wadl, Das Jahr 1945 in
Ka¨rnten: Ein U¨ berblick (Klagenfurt, 1985), and “Britische Besatzung in Ka¨rnten und
in der Steiermark bis zum Jahresende 1945,” in O¨ sterreich 1945: Ein Ende und viele
Anfa¨nge, ed. Manfried Rauchensteiner and Wolfgang Etschmann (Graz, 1997), 247–
72, esp. 261. Other works on provincial denazification apart from Schuster and Weber,
Entnazifizierung: Klaus Eisterer, Franzo¨sische Besatzungspolitik: Tirol und Vorarlberg,
1945/46, Innsbrucker Forschungen zur Zeitgeschichte, vol. 9 (Innsbruck, 1992),
163–237; Kurt Tweraser, US-Milita¨rregierung Obero¨sterreich, vol. 1, Sicherheitspol-
itische Aspekte der amerikanischen Besatzung in Obero¨sterreich-Su¨d, 1945–1950
(Linz, 1995).
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have investigated the deficiencies of denazification in the context of the rees-
tablishment of Carinthian parties and have stressed continuities in attitudes and
personnel.25
Any discussion of Carinthia needs to grapple with the highly elusive notion
of Heimat.26 To oversimplify a complex discussion, the Carinthian Heimat has
been defined for more than a century in two directions: against the capital and
against the Slav world to the south.27 Vienna came to be blamed for many of
the province’s economic troubles, disliked as the capital of the Catholic mul-
tinational empire, and later, in the First Republic, feared as the Marxist, Jewish
“Red Vienna.” The Slav threat was seen as originating from beyond the Kar-
awanken Mountains to the south, but it was also located in the Slovene mi-
nority living within the province after its leaders began to assert its collective
rights in the decades before the First World War. When metropolitan institu-
tions (e.g., the administrative court) gave (limited) support to these rights, both
“anti-Carinthian” “threats” appeared to be reinforcing each other.
With the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy, the struggle to delineate the
border between Carinthia and the new South Slav Kingdom became inter-
twined (as it did in other borderland areas like Styria and Burgenland) with a
struggle over the ethnic identity of the border population. In the end, the com-
petition between ethnically and historically based claims was resolved in favor
of the latter when an internationally supervised plebiscite in the south of the
province in October 1920 produced a 60:40 vote for Austria and against Yu-
goslavia. As a result—in a mirror image of the Czech situation—almost all
of the province’s Slovene-speaking population (nearly thirty-five thousand ac-
cording to the disputed 1923 census) remained in the province. What collective
or individual rights they should enjoy became a central issue of provincial
politics. For a range of German national parties, associations, and clubs the
clear answer was that Carinthia was a bulwark of Deutschtum and the minority
should assimilate or leave.
25 Alfred Elste and Dirk Ha¨nisch, Ka¨rnten von der ersten zur Zweiten Republik:
Kontinuita¨t oder Wandel? (Klagenfurt, 1998), 39–41; Alfred Elste, Michael Koschat,
and Hanzi Filipicˇ, NS-O¨ sterreich auf der Anklagebank: Anatomie eines politischen
Schauprozesses im kommunistischen Slowenien (Klagenfurt, 2000), 52–65; Alfred El-
ste, Ka¨rntens braune Elite (Klagenfurt, 1997), 12–13.
26 See Elizabeth Boa and Rachel Palfreyman, Heimat: A German Dream; Regional
Loyalties and National Identity in German Culture, 1890–1990 (Oxford, 2000).
27 The following summary owes much to Helmut Rumpler, “Die nationale Frage im
Spannungsfeld von ka¨rntnerischem Landespatriotismus, o¨sterreichischem Staatsbe-
wusstsein und vo¨lkischem Nationalismus, 1918–1938,” in Fra¨ss-Ehrfeld and Rumpler,
Ka¨rnten und Wien, 9–82. See also Alfred Ogris, “Anschlussideen in Ka¨rnten in der
Zwischenkriegszeit (1918–1938),” in Das Jahr 1938 in Ka¨rnten und seine Vorgeschi-
chte: Ereignisse—Dokumente—Bilder, ed. Alfred Ogris and Wilhelm Wadl, Das Ka¨rnt-
ner Landesarchiv, vol. 15 (Klagenfurt, 1988), 13–40.
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The goal of a German Heimat politics, as Helmut Rumpler has stressed, did
not necessarily mean an Anschluss with Germany, but in the crisis-ridden and
radicalized interwar period it frequently did. The more radical pan-Germanists
gained ground, and even before Hitler seized power in Germany Carinthian
National Socialists were able to capitalize on anti-Viennese and anti-Slav re-
sentments.28 Despite setbacks after it was declared illegal in 1933, the party
gained support among nearly all sections of society. The Anschluss itself has
plausibly been called the victory of the provinces over Vienna.29 In the follow-
ing years the Nazi state successfully fostered the mythology of the “defensive
struggle” (Abwehrkampf) of 1918–19, in which Carinthia appeared as a bul-
wark of Deutschtum under threat from a devious Slav foe but neglected or
abandoned by the capital. This underpinned a dual project: the expansion of
German dominance to the south (after the invasion of Yugoslavia in April
1941 and the acquisition of “Upper Carniola” and other parts of Yugoslavia)
and a push for the final elimination of Slovene language and culture within
the province itself.
Four years later, denazification was therefore not merely a question of what
to do about thousands of Nazi Party members (amounting to roughly a quarter
of Carinthia’s electorate).30 It was also centrally about how the values that had
sustained the Heimat under Nazi rule could be reconciled with a democratic
Austria.
28 For Carinthian Nazis before the Anschluss see Ulfried Burz, Die Nationalsozial-
istische Bewegung in Ka¨rnten (1918–1933): Vom Deutschnationalismus zum Fu¨hrer-
prinzip, Das Ka¨rntner Landesarchiv, vol. 23 (Klagenfurt, 1998); Alfred Elste and Dirk
Ha¨nisch, Auf dem Weg zur Macht: Beitra¨ge zur Geschichte der NSDAP in Ka¨rnten von
1918 bis 1938 (Vienna, 1997); Bruce F. Pauley, Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis: A
History of Austrian National Socialism (Chapel Hill, NC, 1981), 131, 138–39; Helmut
Rumpler and Ulfried Burz, eds., Ma¨rz 1938: Ka¨rnten; Fallstudien und Dokumente zum
Weg in den “Anschluss” (Klagenfurt, 1989); Ogris and Wadl, Das Jahr 1938. Nazi rule
in Carinthia is notably underresearched, but see Stefan Karner, “‘. . . des Reiches Su¨d-
mark’: Ka¨rnten und Steiermark im ‘Dritten Reich,’ 1938–1945,” in Ta´los et al., NS-
Herrschaft in O¨ sterreich, 292–324. For Germanization and persecution of the Slovene
minority, see Avgusˇtin Malle, ed., Pregon korosˇkih Slovencev, 1942–2002: Die Ver-
treibung der Ka¨rntner Slowenen (Klagenfurt, 2002); Stefan Karner, “Die Aussiedlung
von Ka¨rntner Slowenen, 1942,” in Aussiedlung—Verschleppung–nationaler Kampf,
ed. Stefan Karner and Andreas Moritsch, Ka¨rnten und die Nationale Frage, vol. 1
(Vienna, 2005), 21–51.
29 The classic Austrian study is Ernst Hanisch, Gau der guten Nerven: Die nation-
alsozialistische Herrschaft in Salzburg, 1938–1945 (Salzburg, 1997), originally pub-
lished as Nationalsozialistische Herrschaft in der Provinz: Salzburg im Dritten Reich
(Salzburg, 1983); also Rumpler,“Nationale Frage,” 26.
30 Membership had reached nearly forty-eight thousand in May 1943 (Jagschitz, “Von
der ‘Bewegung,’” 515), not including “candidate members” (Parteianwa¨rter) who may
have amounted to a further ten thousand; see Stiefel, Entnazifizierung, 98; and Wadl,
“Entnazifizierung,” 254.
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II. THE HEIMAT FROM THIRD REICH TO SECOND REPUBLIC
Nazi rule in Carinthia ended when the Gauleiter Friedrich Rainer finally re-
signed, only an hour before midnight on May 7, 1945. It came after negotia-
tions with several pre-Anschluss politicians from the Social Democrats, Chris-
tian Socials, and Agrarian League (Landbund). The provisional government
met for the first time the following morning.31 Only hours later, British and
then Yugoslav forces arrived on the scene.32
It is hard to see this as the victory of a “resistance movement.”33 According
to the account left by Meinrad Natmeßnig, the chief civil servant of the Gau
(Gauamtsdirektor), detailed planning for a transfer of power had not started
until May 3, when Rainer discussed the “formalities of the hand-over of
power” with his inner circle. Strikingly, the only group to which Natmeßnig
was prepared to apply the label “resistance movement” were the Commu-
nists—the only group not admitted into the provisional government until after
Rainer had left the scene. The other politicians, he recorded, were “quite un-
prepared to take over power” and at first unable to propose members of a
provisional government.34 Given the success with which Nazi rule had func-
tioned to the last this is hardly surprising. It is also consistent with the biog-
raphies of the other members of the government, as far as they are known. It
would emerge two years later that the Social Democratic provisional governor
Hans Piesch had probably been involved, albeit only in a middle-ranking po-
31 For the sake of clarity this first government (which lasted from May 7 to June 6)
will be designated PKLR (Provisorische Ka¨rntner Landesregierung) 1, the second pro-
visional government (recognized by the British) as PKLR 2 (July 24 to December 10),
the intermediate “Consultative Committee” or Konsultativer Landesauschuss as KL
(June 6–July 24), and the government formed after the elections of November 1945,
the Ka¨rntner Landesregierung, as KLR.
32 See, among others, Walzl, Ka¨rnten 1945, and Die Bewa¨ltigung, 198–209; Wadl,
Das Jahr 1945; Hanns Haas and Karl Stuhlpfarrer, O¨ sterreich und seine Slowenen
(Vienna, 1977), 88; Gabriela Stieber, Die Briten als Besatzungsmacht in Ka¨rnten,
1945–1955, Das Ka¨rntner Landesarchiv, vol. 31 (Klagenfurt, 2005), 37–55. For a vivid
eyewitness account see Peter Wilkinson, Foreign Fields: The Story of an SOE Operative
(London, 1997), 234–38.
33 The term is used by, among others, Wadl, Das Jahr 1945, 30; Manfried Rauch-
ensteiner, Der Sonderfall: Die Besatzungszeit in O¨ sterreich, 1945–1955 (Graz, 1979),
86–87; Alfred Elste and Michael Koschat, “Kontinuita¨t der politischen Eliten, 1918–
1945,” in Nationale Frage und O¨ ffentlichkeit, ed. Werner Drobesch and Avgusˇtin Malle,
Ka¨rnten und die Nationale Frage, vol. 2 (Vienna, 2005), 166.
34 Meinrad Natmeßnig, “Erinnerung an die Geschehen Ka¨rntens in den Tagen des
Zusammenbruches Großdeutschlands, den schwersten Tagen in der Geschichte des
Deutschen Reiches und den schicksalsschwerste Tage [sic] meines Heimatlandes
Ka¨rnten,” (copy) n.d., Slovenski Znanstveni Insˇtitut (Archive of the Slovene Scientific
Institute; ASZI), Celovec (Klagenfurt), C, XII.
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sition, in the implementation of Nazi racial policies.35 Some of Carinthia’s other
“founding fathers” had also supported the Nazi regime.36 Several of the new
leaders, however, both conservative and socialist (or Social Democratic), had
been its victims.37 The most important of these was Ferdinand Wedenig, the
socialist who in 1947 would succeed Piesch as governor. Between the poles
of active collaboration and imprisonment were several government members,
probably the majority, who had simply kept their heads down, continued to
work, and survived.38
If these politicians had a common cause it was the defense of Carinthia
against the rapidly approaching Yugoslav forces. The “idiom” of Heimat might
in principle, as Celia Applegate has argued for another locality, have been able
to embody “the political and social community that could be salvaged from
the Nazi ruins.”39 But if that community was to be based on a democratic
35 William Mack (British minister, Vienna), writing to Bevin (March 14, 1947, Public
Record Office [PRO], FO371/63958/C44376), reported that it had emerged that Piesch
had worked in a “Race Office” that “dealt with the expropriation of Jews and the
confiscation of their property as well as of the Resettlement Office, which was con-
cerned with exchanges of population and attendant property questions in Carniola
[Krain].” See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People’s Republic of
Yugoslavia, ed., Documents on the Carinthian Question (Belgrade, 1948), docs. 31,
32. See also Elste and Ha¨nisch, Ka¨rnten von der ersten zur Zweiten Republik, 57, 309,
who question the extent of Piesch’s complicity.
36 For example, Wolfram Enzfelder, now responsible for Social Administration (So-
ziale Verwaltung), had worked as a journalist for the official Gau newspaper, the Ka¨rnt-
ner Grenzruf. See Robert Buchacher, “Die Tages- und Wochenpresse des Bundeslandes
Ka¨rnten von der Gru¨ndung der Republik bis zur Gegenwart (1918–1973)” (PhD diss.,
University of Vienna, 1973), 226. Julius Lukas junior had become a Nazi Party member
in May 1940. He was forced to resign in February 1946 (Berlin Document Centre, File
on Julius Lukas; Political Report Ka¨rnten, September 1946 and January 1947, PRO,
FO1007/335).
37 For an example of a conservative leader, there is the former Christian Social Alois
Karisch, who was to become head of the Carinthian People’s Party and deputy governor.
See Rumpler, Ma¨rz 1938, 295. Sylvester Leer had been a Christian Social member of
the Landtag and a leading opponent and target of the Nazi Party before 1934. See
Rudolf Freisitzer, “Der Beginn des NS-Terrors,” in Rumpler, Ma¨rz 1938, 6, 216; Elste
and Ha¨nisch, Auf dem Weg, 213, 219, 230. On Ignaz Tschurtschentaler see Rumpler,
“Der nationale Dammbruch nach dem Juliabkommen des Jahres 1936; Die politische
und wirtschaftliche Situation Ka¨rntens in Vorfeld des ‘Anschlusses’,” in Rumpler and
Burz, Ma¨rz 1938, 14–31, 16; Freisitzer, “Beginn,” 216–17, 297. Some Socialist lead-
ers, like Anton Falle, had died in concentration camps; others, like Hans Lagger, re-
turned, physically damaged, but continued to pursue political careers in minor posi-
tions.
38 This probably applies to Hans Herke, Julius Santer, Josef Ritscher, Karl Perchtold,
and Hans Ferlitsch.
39 Celia Applegate, A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat (Berkeley,
1990), 242.
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reorientation, some scrutiny of how the Heimat had become implicated in the
Nazi project was surely required. Beyond occasional general references to
avoiding past mistakes there was almost no sign of this in Carinthia. On the
contrary, the Heimat idiom helped ease the transition from the Nazi regime to
its successor. For example, Rainer had insisted in his negotiations with the
politicians that the ideals of the 1918–19 Abwehrkampf (defensive struggle)
had to be represented in any body that succeeded him. The politicians had
reassured him that they had always stood by the principle of “a free and un-
divided Carinthia” (Ka¨rnten frei und ungeteilt). To protect the border Rainer
proposed setting up a “League of Defenders of the Border” that should be
organized in a way that would avoid the charge of being “a camouflaged SA
or something similar.” In response the politicians assured him that only the
district leaders (Kreisleiter) were unacceptable as “fighters” (for the border)
and that only Nazis who had violated the law would be punished. No one
would be punished purely on the ground of party membership. Piesch promised
that “we will . . . only implement personnel changes, and these won’t be done
quickly.” Rainer then promised that “the fighting forces of the party would not
oppose the new regime” and declared himself ready to help to preserve the
unity of the province.40 The unity of the province was duly featured in Rainer’s
valedictory radio speech, Natmeßnig’s public statement, and the first decla-
ration of the new government, all of which were published the next day. The
government mentioned legal proceedings against the guilty but ruled out
purges for the mass of party members.41 All this shows how, even before Nazi
rule had ended, mobilization behind the Heimat undercut denazification. By
contrast Piesch was soon rewriting the end of the Nazi regime as a Carinthian
“self-liberation,” with the implication that no further purges were required.42
How loyalty to Carinthia outweighed involvement in National Socialism
can be seen in the case of Natmeßnig himself. Having initially been included
in the provincial government, he was arrested by the British.43 Six weeks later
the bank that had earlier employed him (the Klagenfurt Gewerbe- und Han-
delsbank) lobbied the provincial government to press for his release, arguing
that “as a leading Bank director he could put his great knowledge and abilities
in the service of the economy of Carinthia.” In the ensuing discussion
Natmeßnig’s past efficiency and promotion of the province’s interests were
cited in mitigation of his responsibility for serving the Nazi state. Though some
40 Natmeßnig, “Erinnerung”; “Ka¨rnten—ein freies Land O¨ sterreichs!” Ka¨rntner Zei-
tung, May 8, 1945; Elste and Ha¨nisch, Ka¨rnten von der ersten zur Zweiten Republik,
55 n. 165; and Elste, Koschat, and Filipicˇ, NS-O¨ sterreich, 131.
41 See, among others, Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, O¨ sterreich, 88; Elste, Koschat, and
Filipicˇ, NS-O¨ sterreich, 130 n. 523.
42 KL 5th session, June 20, 1945, Ka¨rnter Landesarchiv, Landesamtsdirektion [here-
after KLA, LAD]; see also Stieber, Die Briten, 106 n. 53.
43 Walzl, Ka¨rnten 1945, 249.
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doubts were expressed, the government backed the request for his release.44
Natmeßnig’s past service to Carinthia was divorced from the regime it had
supported. The “depoliticization” of the Heimat was thus itself a highly po-
litical process.
In the following years, loyalty to the Heimat remained a central rhetorical
category in Carinthian politics. With it came a fundamental polarization: on
one side stood the Carinthian parties, supposedly united in defense of the
province; on the other, Carinthia’s enemies. In this division those Slovenes
who were ethnically conscious were liable to be considered traitors. Behind
this view lay the widespread feeling (noted in an Office of Strategic Services
[OSS] report of July 1945) that the minority “deserved and continues to de-
serve no better fate than absorption into the superior German community.”45
III. BRITISH AND CARINTHIAN DENAZIFICATION
The British occupation regime, which began shortly after the Carinthian pro-
visional government was formed and continued—at least on paper—until
1955, never seriously attempted to change the values of the society it was
responsible for. Admittedly, Austria would need to be separated from Germany,
to prevent any future Anschluss or revival of National Socialism, but that
policy should, where possible, be implemented by working with, not against,
the grain of Austrian society.46 Tension between the two aims was already
implicit in the Moscow Declaration, which had not only proclaimed Austria
to have been a victim of “Hitlerite aggression” but also warned that account
would be taken of the fact that it had fought “as an integral part of Hitlerite
Germany.” In the eighteen months that elapsed between the declaration and
the end of the war it had become clear that Austrian national identity had not
been strong enough to inspire significant resistance. To that extent the case for
44 KL 5th session, June 20, 1945, KLA, LAD.
45 Research and Analysis Report 19, Johnson, July 6, 1945, in Siegfried Beer, “Ka¨rn-
ten im Fru¨hsommer 1945: Drei Berichte und Analysen des Amerikanischen Geheim-
und Nachrichtendienstes OSS zu Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in einem britisch-
besetzten Bundesland,” in Carinthia I, 177 (1987): 433–36, 426 (author’s translation
back into English). For minority politics see Theodor Domej, “Der Konflikt nach dem
Krieg,” in Austria Slovenica: Die Ka¨rntner Slovenen und die Nation O¨ sterreich/Korosˇki
Slovenci in avstrijska nacija, ed. Andreas Moritsch (Klagenfurt, 1996), 86–165.
46 For British denazification policy in Austria in general, see Knight, “Britische Ent-
nazifizierungspolitik”; Siegfried Beer, “Die Briten und der Wiederaufbau des Justiz-
wesens in der Steiermark, 1945–1950,” in Die “britische” Steiermark 1945–1955,
ed. Siegfried Beer (Graz, 1995), 111–40; Wolfgang Muchitsch, “Das Volksgericht
Graz, 1946–1955,” in Beer, Die “britische” Steiermark, 141–56; Siegfried Beer, “Die
britische Entnazifizierung in O¨ sterreich, 1945–1948,” in Schuster and Weber, Entna-
zifizierung, 399–430; Stieber, Die Briten, 171–82, 237–40.
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an interventionist occupation might appear stronger at the end of the war than
it had in Moscow. At any rate, by May 1945 a denazification policy similar to
that applied in Germany was probably inevitable.47 Intervention was also sup-
ported by the British legal view that—whatever the ambiguities of its situa-
tion—Austria was to be occupied as a (part of a) defeated enemy. British
troops officially entered Austria “as victors, inasmuch as Austria has waged
war as an integral part of Germany against the United Nations.”48
However, although the denazification guidelines of the British military
broadly followed those of the U.S. Counter-Intelligence Corps, British officials
already had strong reservations about their wide (and ever-expanding) scope.
Some of these sprang from an awareness of the financial and logistical pres-
sures on the British economy and its global commitments. In this context,
Austria was hardly a major priority and reeducating Austrians even less so.
The view in Whitehall was that Austria’s long-term future and its separation
from Germany could be secured only by cultivating the “tender growth of
Austrian independence,” by avoiding the social and political divisions that had
plagued the First Republic, and above all by creating a prosperous international
economic environment.49 This pointed away from a punitive approach and
toward conciliation and collaboration.
As far as Austria’s provinces were concerned, British planners recognized
that the attractions of “pan-Germanism” for the provincial middle classes had
been one reason why Austrian statehood had failed. But so long as this did
not lead to a renewal of an Anschluss movement the “internal” implications
of pan-Germanism were not taken very seriously. British officials and soldiers
were generally oblivious to the depth of ethnic tension in the area. They tended
to think that differences could be defused by common sense or by “knocking
heads together.” As it became clear that neither Yugoslav territorial claims to
southern Carinthia nor irredentism within the minority would be deflected,
most came to see the minority simply as a security danger to be dealt with by
security measures.50
47 See Lothar Kettenacker, Krieg zur Friedensicherung: Die Deutschlandplanung der
britischen Regierung wa¨hrend des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Go¨ttingen, 1988), 353–73; Ian
Turner, “Denazification in the British Zone,” in British Occupation Policy and the
Western Zones, 1945–1955, ed. Ian Turner (Oxford, 1989), 239–70.
48 First proclamation reprinted in Gary Travers Grayson Jr., Austria’s International
Position, 1938–1945: The Re-establishment of Independent Austria (Geneva, 1953),
192–93; see also Wadl, Das Jahr 1945, 35; Stieber, Die Briten, 68–71.
49 Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Postwar Economic Policy toward
Austria, Armistice Terms and Postwar Planning Committee (APW) (44) 93, September
22, 1944, PRO Cabinet Office Papers (CAB) 87/68.
50 See Robert Knight, “Ethnicity and Identity in the Cold War: The Carinthian Bor-
der Dispute,” International History Review 22 (2000): 274–303; Stieber, Die Briten,
295–326.
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The British decision to work with the Carinthian provisional government
that they found in situ amounted to an early prioritizing of collaboration over
intervention. Jack Nicholls, the senior British diplomat attached to the Eighth
Army, described the government as “precisely the sort of reasonably represen-
tative security-checked body” the Foreign Office had wanted to see in place
in Austria as a first step toward the reestablishment of full democracy. Overall,
the government was a “reasonably solid firm and anxious to cooperate with
us.” Piesch himself appeared “genuine and not too clever” (for Nicholls, this
was clearly a recommendation).51 A fortnight after the government’s formation
one official did express fear that the “Piesch Party” might be “suspect to a
large degree owing to it having been formed before our arrival,” but this con-
cern was brushed aside; since the provisional government had in effect already
been recognized by the military government there would be “confusion if we
now go back on this.” It was decided to approve the Carinthian body as an
interim solution “until popular wishes become clearer.”52 Admittedly, it was
also decided to downgrade it temporarily to the status of an “advisory com-
mittee” without executive functions, but this was a secondary and temporary
measure.53 The important point was that by accepting Carinthian “collabora-
tors” the British inaugurated a relationship of mutual dependence; the British
had the coercive means to arrest, dismiss, or intern, but since they did not have
the resources or the will to govern at the point of bayonets they became de-
pendent on the Carinthians.
In his opening speech to the Carinthian Advisory Committee (Konsultativer
Landesauschuss), Colonel Donald Smith (senior military government officer)
stressed the twin goals of restoring an administration that stood above politics
and “ensuring that the Nazi element is eliminated.”54 He evidently saw no
contradiction between the two goals, yet the conflict soon emerged in two
senses. First, the tension between the “administrators” and the “denazifiers”
became a permanent feature of the first year of military government,55 Second,
for Carinthian politicians both administrative appointments and denazification
were inextricably part of politics.
51 Nicholls (c/o 5 Corps) to Hughes (ACABE), Rome, May 21, 1945, PRO, FO1020/
977 (Nicholls’s emphasis); see also Stieber, Die Briten, 71.
52 Hughes to Nicholls, May 26, 1945, Nicholls to Hughes, May 26, 1945, PRO,
FO1020/977.
53 See Memorandum, Powers of Provisional Governments in Styria and Carinthia,
Deputy Commissioner Conference/Paper (DCC/P) (45) 13, July 31, 1945, PRO,
FO371/46611/C4327. Many Carinthian authors overestimate the importance of the de-
motion, e.g., Walzl, Ka¨rnten 1945, 266–67; Wadl, “Britische Besatzung,” 254; Stieber,
Die Briten, 71–75.
54 Smith speech (German trans.), n.d., PRO, FO1020/976.
55 Cullis minute, August 28, 1945, PRO, FO371/46649/C5088.
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The “denazifiers” in the Intelligence, Public Safety, and Field Security sec-
tions proceeded on the basis of the official guidelines. These laid down formal
criteria for mass dismissal, arrest, and internment on the basis of rank and
position in Nazi party or state organizations (“category arrests”), as well as
allowing for “discretionary arrests” in a small number of situations. Decisions
were to be made on the basis of the famous (or notorious) questionnaires
(Fragebo¨gen).56 By February 1946, 6,413 people had been arrested (in Styria
and Carinthia and the British zone of Vienna combined).57 Most of them, in-
cluding a large number of senior Nazi officials in the Gau administration, were
held in the internment camps of Weissenstein and Wolfsberg.58 In addition,
23,789 Fragebo¨gen had passed through the military government’s hands (in
all its Austrian occupation zones), leading to approximately 18,500 employ-
ment certificates being issued (3,032 were turned down).59
For all this activity, denazification soon faced the same problems that it did
in Germany. Criticism mounted both inside and outside the military govern-
ment. Most of it boiled down to the charge that official instructions were too
formalistic and crude to assess how individuals had actually behaved in the
Third Reich.60 One report argued that “the expression ‘dangerous Nazi’ is one
incapable of definition and least of all of definition by categories” since it
“could not adequately encompass the different degrees of commitment to Na-
zism.”61 Several criticized the failure to arrest local industrialists who had
backed the Nazi Party economically in its illegal period before the Anschluss
and profited from the war economy without necessarily becoming party
members.
For some of those responsible for denazification these weaknesses were an
56 Allied Forces Headquarters [AFHQ], Counter Intelligence/Security Instruction
(Austria) no. 2 (Vetting/Screening of Allied Employees in Austria), May 2, 1945, and
CI/Security Instruction (Austria) no. 6 (Arrestable Categories in Austria), May 24,
1945, Instruction no. 29 (including tables A–D), May 28, 1945, PRO, FO1020/1097;
see also Garscha, “Entnazifizierung,” 855–57.
57 Philip Nicholls to Bevin, February 5, 1946, PRO, FO371/55158/C1890. Of these
5,883 had been “category arrests.”
58 See list (“Verzeichnis”) n.d [presumably February 1946], O¨ sterreichisches Staats-
archiv, Archiv der Republik [hereafter O¨ StA, AdR], Bundeskanzleramt [BKA], Ent-
nazifizierung, box 22.
59 Political Report, February 1946, PRO, FO1007/335.
60 Area Security Office, Carinthia District, July 19–26, 1945, PRO, WO170/7144.
See also Consolidated Intelligence Report [hereafter CIR] 9, September 19, 1945, CIR
11, October 3, 1945, published in Gabriela Stieber, ed., Consolidated Intelligence Re-
ports: Psychological Warfare Branch; Military Government Ka¨rnten, Mai 1945 bis
April 1946, Das Ka¨rntner Landesarchiv, vol. 32 (Klagenfurt, 2005), 158, 182; also Beer,
“Ka¨rnten im Fru¨hsommer 1945”; Eisterer, Franzo¨sische Besatzungspolitik, 189.
61 Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary (JWIS) 10, September 7, 1945, PRO, FO371/
46651/C6378.
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argument for extending the purge to those who had provided economic support
for National Socialism.62 For the “administrators,” however, they strengthened
the case for allowing more flexibility for qualified experts (especially within
the administration of justice and education). As one official (of the Economic
Division) put it, “all the available brains were wanted” to get Austrian industry
working again.63 From this perspective, purges were an irritant or worse. An
education official complained that Public Safety interventions could mean that
“the first thing they knew, the school was without a teacher.”64 In the admin-
istration of justice the objections of senior British officials to the removal of
judges and state prosecutors later led to a common front with Austrian officials
in the Justice Ministry.65 Several illegal Nazis were retained as judges and
prosecutors. British justice officials themselves conceded that “we have laid
somewhat more emphasis on the efficiency of the machine than Intelligence
Organization, with their emphasis on denazification at the expense of effi-
ciency, would have done themselves.”66
Almost from the start denazification had involved Carinthian politicians as
advisers. Now, in response to criticism and the bureaucratic pressures, their
role was extended.67 The rationale was that Carinthian politicians possessed
the kind of local knowledge that could mitigate the crude formalism of the
Fragebogen system. What this overlooked was that Carinthian politicians had
different assumptions and a different agenda. Admittedly, they too wished to
“get things moving” and like British administrators were irritated by the actions
of the intelligence organizations.68 But even more important, denazification
was subordinated to party competition, and after four years of authoritarian
dictatorship and seven years of Nazi rule this was now gathering momentum.69
Party politics transformed denazification from a policy for determining who
was to be purged (or punished) into a contest about who should be exempted.
Neither attachment to the Carinthian Heimat nor the proverbial Geist der
62 Weekly Security Intelligence Report (WSIR) 5, August 3, 1945, PRO, FO371/
46611/C4833.
63 Piggott, British Standing De-Nazification Committee (BSDC), 3rd meeting, No-
vember 27, 1945, PRO, FO1007/412.
64 BSDC, 3rd meeting, November 27, 1945, PRO, FO1007/412; Stieber, Die Briten,
237–40. For a similar analysis see Beer, “Die britische Entnazifizierung,” 412–23.
65 See Area Security Office, Carinthia, October 1945. PRO, WO170/7144; CIR 10,
September 26, 1945, in Stieber, Consolidated Intelligence Reports, 173; Polaschek,
Volksgerichte, 18–30; Beer, “Die britische Entnazifizierung,” 418–19.
66 Memorandum, Bulger Ministry of Justice Control Branch (LEGDIV), March 1,
1946, PRO, FO1020/1979.
67 See, e.g., Public Safety Office Wolfsburg, May 18, 1945, PRO, FO1020/2881.
68 See Beer, “Die britische Entnazifizierung,” 415.
69 In general see Knut Lehmann-Horn, “Die Macht der politischen Parteien,” in Rum-
pler, Ka¨rnten, 215–67.
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Lagerstrasse—that is, a cross-party spirit of unity forged in the crucible of
shared suffering in Nazi concentration camps—could create a cross-party con-
sensus on whom to exempt. For many socialists the memory of their perse-
cution before 1938 remained fresh. The fact that their persecutors might them-
selves have suffered subsequently under Nazi rule did not cancel it out.70 Their
conservative opponents were acutely aware of the weakness of the Christian
Socials in a province where anticlerical traditions were so strong. The (qual-
ified) turning away from political Catholicism by the People’s Party was meant
to broaden its appeal nationally, and the decision to merge with the German
national and anticlerical Landbund (Agrarian League) was intended to achieve
this by attracting non-Catholic conservative or “anti-Marxist” voters. But in
Carinthia it also brought the socialists a chance to win support from those
voters who continued to be suspicious of the People’s Party’s links with the
Catholic Church and who were still resentful of the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg
regime.71
In this competition neither party was willing to do without former Nazi
Party (NSDAP) members. As elsewhere in Austria, the Socialists considered
they were at an unfair disadvantage to their conservative rivals who could
recruit from Catholic fraternities (in the Cartellverband).72 Some of their old
members had gone over to the Nazi Party before the Anschluss or had come
round to support it afterward.73 Others had been conscripted and killed in action
or imprisoned. In June 1945 the first Socialist provincial conference (Landes-
parteikonferenz) decided that NSDAP members could join as “supporting
members” (unterstu¨tzende Mitglieder). It was the start of an intense recruit-
ment drive.74
The British decision to rely on Piesch gave the Socialists a head start in
personnel decisions. These included hiring for positions not only in public
administration but also in the teaching profession, which had strong German
national and anticlerical traditions and where the level of Nazi membership
70 See, e.g., CIR 10, September 7, 1945, in Stieber, Consolidated Intelligence Re-
ports, 176.
71 Werner Drobesch, “Die Geschichte der Ka¨rntner O¨ VP, 1945–1994,” in Die Volks-
partei—Anspruch und Realita¨t: Zur Geschichte der Geschichte der O¨ VP seit 1945,
ed. Robert Kriechbaumer and Franz Schausberger (Vienna, 1995), 399–424; Dieter
Binder, “‘Von der “Rettung des christlichen Abendlandes” zu “Europa in uns”’: Die
o¨sterreichische Volkspartei nach 1945,” in Christdemokratie in Europa im 20. Jahr-
hundert, ed. Michael Gehler, Wolfram Kaiser, and Helmut Wohnout (Vienna, 2001),
399–424.
72 Neugebauer and Schwarz, BSA.
73 See for the Vienna socialist party Matthew Berg, “Die SPO¨ und die Praxis der
Entnazifizierung,” in Mesner, Entnazifizierung, 146–85.
74 CIR 1, July 19, 1945, in Stieber, Consolidated Intelligence Reports, 90–91; Elste
and Ha¨nisch, Ka¨rnten von der ersten zur Zweiten Republik, 21–35, 43, 65–68.
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had been high.75 On the opposite side of the party divide, the People’s Party was
ready to call for purges in public service but resisted pressure to dismiss Nazi
members in the conservative strongholds of the farming organization (Bauern-
schaft), business, and banking. Their leader, Hans Ferlitsch, warned of the dire
consequences of purging the farming organization and claimed, rather contra-
dictorily, that without outside interference it would have long since been
“cleansed.”76
Both sides criticized the British for inept or unjust decisions.77 But it would
be wrong to conclude that a collective Carinthian wish to implement a more
sweeping purge was being thwarted by the occupiers. What politicians of both
parties clearly did want was more freedom to appoint or exempt within their
own fiefdoms. The frequently expressed concern for the individual rights of
the denazified, including the right of appeal in order to mitigate the formalism
and unfairness of the Fragebogen system, can also be seen in this light.78 At
the same time there was room for bargaining between the two parties, as in
one case where the appointment of a Socialist candidate as mayor was offset
by an agreement that his deputy should be taken from “the bourgeois group.”79
Such ad hoc arrangements pointed to the future development of Austria’s Pro-
porz system—but the point here is that they were rarely accompanied by
scrutiny of individual culpability.
In the course of the summer of 1945 the role of Carinthian politicians ex-
panded, and so did their self-confidence.80 The government was given a central
role in the appointments first of mayors and chief district civil servants (Be-
zirkshauptleute), then of village councilors.81 At the start of September a new
75 Smith speech (German version, n.d.), PRO, FO1020/976; Richardson, “Report on
Visit to Ka¨rnten, Review of Educational Situation,” June 4, 1945, PRO, FO1020/2817;
Stieber, Die Briten, 237–40; Herman Gruber, Die Jahre in der Politik: Erinnerungen
(Klagenfurt, 1982), 47–49. Ulfried Burz, “Der Wille der Lehrerschaft ist der Wille des
Volkes.: Bildungspolitische Zielsetzungen und Aktivita¨ten der nationalsozialistischen
Bewegung in Ka¨rnten,” in Zur Geschichte des o¨sterreichischen Bildungswesens: Prob-
leme und Perspektiven der Forschung, ed. Elmar Lechner, Helmut Rumpler, and Herbert
Zdarzil (Vienna, 1992), 498–514.
76 KL 5th session, June 20, 1945, KLA, LAD. See Elste and Ha¨nisch, Ka¨rnten von
der ersten zur Zweiten Republik, 46–47, 103.
77 See, e.g., Stieber, Die Briten, 179.
78 See Amschl’s comments to KL 5th session, June 20, 1945, KLA, LAD. The claim
by Elste and Ha¨nisch, Ka¨rnten von der ersten zur Zweiten Republik, 137, that Amschl
had himself been a party member appears to be based on a confusion of names since
they refer to a Hans Amschl born September 21, 1909, whereas the politician Hans
Amschl was born on October 29, 1896.
79 KL 5th session, June 20, 1945, KLA, LAD.
80 Ibid. See also CIR 4, August 14, 1945, in Stieber, Consolidated Intelligence Re-
ports, 120–21.
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system of vetting and appointment was announced. Commissions representing
the three authorized “antifascist” parties and chaired by a civil servant were
to vet and then dismiss or confirm appointments for the lower levels of the
civil service (below the Third Grade/Dienstgrad III).82 Advisory committees
in each district were to make recommendations on the arrest of persons still
at liberty, the release of those interned, and the reinstatement and dismissal of
officials. The edifice was to be topped by a provincial advisory commission
(Landesberatungskommission).83
British Intelligence argued that the new system would mean that those with
local knowledge would now be able to pick out the “real Nazis.” However,
the linkages between denazification and political patronage became even more
evident as provincial and national elections approached. At first it was widely
assumed that most, perhaps all, former Nazi Party members would be allowed
to vote.84 The efforts of the parties to woo them were probably only partly
nullified by the decision to exclude all Nazi Party members from the franchise,
since the exclusion was only partially enforced and in any case did not affect
families and sympathizers.85 Uncertainties about the electoral roll, migration,
and other imponderables make it impossible to say with any conviction how
this affected the election result of November 26, 1945. What is undeniable is
that the SPO¨ victory in Carinthia represented a massive improvement on their
best prewar performance (from 31.5 to 42.8 percent of the electoral roll, rep-
resenting about twenty thousand more votes). Over half of these may have
come from outside traditional socialist or Communist constituencies.86
Memorandum Bell (Govt. Branch) Allied Commission for Austria, British Element,
Rome, July 10, 1945, and Brown (Internal Affairs Division), July 12, 1945, PRO,
FO1020/975.
82 Erlass Nr 12 (“Die Sa¨uberung gewisser Verwaltungszweige von Nationalsozial-
isten”), KLA, Erla¨sse (English version: decree no. 12, PRO, FO945/50); Stieber, Die
Briten, 176.
83 PKLR 2, 17th session, October 31, 1945, KLA, LAD.
84 For example, Newole (who as provincial chief civil servant had responsibility for
drawing up electoral rolls) expected that “harmless” party members (whom he esti-
mated at perhaps 80 percent of the total) would be allowed to vote: CIR 11, October
3, 1945, in Stieber, Consolidated Intelligence Reports, 182.
85 Ludwig Reichhold, Geschichte der O¨ VP (Graz, 1975), 122–23; Rauchensteiner,
Sonderfall, 130. See CIR 16, November 8, 1945, in Stieber, Consolidated Intelligence
Reports, 230; also Brigitte Bailer-Galanda, Die Entstehung der Ru¨ckstellungs- und Ent-
scha¨digungsgesetzgebung: Die Republik O¨ sterreich und das in der NS-Zeit entzogene
Vermo¨gen, O¨ sterreichische Historikerkommission, vol. 3 (Vienna, 2003), 44.
86 See Elste and Ha¨nisch, Ka¨rnten von der ersten zur Zweiten Republik, 186–87,
198–200 (tables 5.3, 5.4), who estimate that only 48 percent of SPO¨ voters may have
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With half the total seats in the provincial Landtag (18 out of 36) behind
him, Piesch was appointed governor, and Carinthia became (apart from the
“city-province” of Vienna) Austria’s only “red” province. This meant a further
increase of SPO¨ patronage in the public sector and an increase in the party’s
self-confidence in asserting its agenda against what was increasingly seen as
British “tutelage.” As for the new British denazification “system,” its work,
when it finally began, showed how wide the gulf was between British and
Carinthian expectations. The committees concentrated heavily on recommend-
ing the reinstatement of those dismissed or the restoration of their pension
rights.87 Similarly, the appointment by the Carinthian government of Paul Jobst
as “denazification commissar” responsible for the “direction and monitoring
of all denazification measures” was not so much an attempt to increase the
tempo of denazification as to assert Carinthian—and SPO¨ —control over it.88
Jobst complained of British tutelage while still combating in the press the
persistent allegations that Carinthia was particularly “brown.”89 The failure of
the committees was ascribed by one senior British intelligence officer to his
belief that “the Austrians feared to denounce prominent Nazis in case they
should suffer for their action when the Allies had withdrawn. This was in itself
an indication that denazification had not gone far enough—more particularly
. . . in the case of prominent industrialists and financiers.”90 Others saw it as a
“cultural” problem—the intrusion of party politics and patronage into an area
that, as Smith had urged, should have been above politics.91
These and other diagnoses were aired within the upper echelons of the
military government in a confused and sometimes ill-tempered discussion.
Colonel Block (senior military government officer for Styria) tried to clarify
British policy by laying down procedures for both integration and punishment.
He advocated deporting the “real bad hats” to North Africa or elsewhere and
warned dramatically that “the stage is set for history to repeat itself.” In con-
clusion he recommended, first, “an Allied Proclamation stating that we intend
to retain control for at least a decade” and, second, “a strong constructive
handling of the Nazis.” Otherwise, “if we leave behind the possibility of a
87 See, inter alia, CIR 26, January 16, 1946, in Stieber, Consolidated Intelligence
Reports, 348–49.
88 KLR 5th session, January 23, 1946, KLA, LAD; CIR 27, January 23, 1946, in
Stieber, Consolidated Intelligence Reports, 357; KLR 15th session, April 10, 1946,
KLA, LAD. See also Jobst’s comments in KLR 24th session, May 31, 1946, KLA,
LAD.
89 Paul Jobst, “Souvera¨nita¨t und Unzufriedenheit,” Die Neue Zeit, January 13, 1946,
“Kuratel oder Kontrolle,” Die Neue Zeit, January 20, 1946, and “Das ‘braune’ Ka¨rn-
ten?” Neue Zeit, March 10, 1946.
90 Gibson, BSDC, 5th meeting, January 8, 1946, PRO, FO1007/413, cited in Knight,
“Entnazifizierungspolitik,” 291–92; Beer, “Die britische Entnazifizierung,” 419–20.
91 Turton, “Report on Tour of Ka¨rnten,” January 4, 1946, PRO, FO1020/2033.
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Nazi come-back, we shall not properly have won the war.”92 The head of
Intelligence, Brigadier Hitchens, responded with a call for a return to first
principles, an acceptance that it was not “necessarily Austrian policy at all to
rid Austria of the Nazis” but it was the Allied task to enforce denazification,
even at the cost of efficiency losses. His optimistic assertion that British policy
“is certainly not muddled” was belied by this and subsequent discussions.93
Beyond the evident frustration and confusion one thing was clear: there would
be no widening and deepening of denazification. On the contrary, British man-
power, including intelligence, had already been reduced by the chiefs of staff,
and further reductions were on the way. Growing East-West tensions provided
a further argument for winding down a policy that seemed to be undermining
the Austrian government. These concerns now received the backing of the
Foreign Office, which saw Soviet criticism of Austrian denazification as part
of a campaign to undermine a pro-Western government. Denazification was
“emphatically not a rock on which we want the Austrian ship of state to risk
. . . floundering [sic].”94 Even without the cold war, political opinion in Britain,
insofar as it was interested in Austria at all, tended to rally behind the new
coalition government; the fears of anti-Prussian conservatives like Lord Van-
sittart and the solidarity of Labour MPs with the SPO¨ converged on this point.
Concerns about denazification increasingly focused on its apparent unfairness
and its feared disintegrative effects.95 The Second Control Agreement of June
1946 provided a formal framework for the British to withdraw from the de-
nazification program. It allowed them to clothe in the mantle of “high policy”
what was really a disorderly retreat from a problem that, only a year after the
end of the war, appeared intractable.96
IV. FEDERAL DENAZIFICATION BETWEEN ALLIES AND PROVINCES
Denazification had been instigated by the occupiers and modified through the
participation of the province. The federal government was conspicuous by its
92 Block memorandum, February 27, 1946, PRO, FO1020/1096. See also Stieber,
Die Briten, 181 (who wrongly attributes the memorandum to A. C. Wilkinson).
93 Hitchins, March 12, 1946 (app. A), PRO, FO1020/1097. Stieber, Die Briten, 180–
81, wrongly sees this as a representative British view. See the minutes of the BSDC,
8th meeting, March 27, 1946, PRO, FO1007/413.
94 Cullis, March 22, 1946, PRO FO 371/55256/C3203; Knight, “Entnazifizierungs-
politik,” 293.
95 Hansard, House of Lords Debates, vol. 139, cols. 890–98, 907–9; Santo Jeger and
Maurice Orbach, Austria 1946 (London, 1946); House of Commons Estimates Com-
mittee, Minutes of Evidence Taken before Sub-committee F (London, 1946), paras. 70–
71; Knight, “Entnazifizierungspolitik,” 287.
96 Philip Nicholls minute, October 19, 1946, PRO, FO945/786; Beer, “Die britische
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absence. This was basically because the British refused to recognize the pro-
visional government formed under the auspices of the Red Army in April 1945.
The British stance has generally been seen, probably correctly, as shortsighted
and counterproductive. Certainly their fear that the head of the government,
the veteran Social Democrat Karl Renner, was a pliable figure who had been
appointed to pave the way for a Soviet takeover proved wide of the mark. But
did the separation of the province from the capital also stymie any chance of
effective denazification, as has often been argued? The evidence suggests that
it did not. The record of the provisional government is of ministers staggering
from one improvisation to the next, arriving by the end of 1945 at a point
of almost impenetrable confusion.97 Their failure can be explained, first, by
the absence of any agreement about what the much-cited distinction between
“serious” and “less serious” Nazis should actually mean in policy terms and,
second, and more fundamentally, by the extent to which Nazi Party members
and their families and friends were embedded in Austrian society.
The Renner government was made up proportionately of representatives of
the three “antifascist” parties, but there was no common “antifascist under-
standing” on how to approach denazification. The cooperation that gradually
emerged between the “black” (former Christian Social) and “red” (former So-
cial Democrat) camps was based on avoiding the issue, not on a shared ex-
perience of Nazi concentration camps. As in the provinces, neither side had
really agreed to bury the hatchets of pre-Anschluss conflict—merely to con-
tinue with them sheathed but ready.98
If there was common ground in the federal government on the “Nazi ques-
tion” it lay between the leadership of the Communist Party (KPO¨ ) and part of
the leadership of the People’s Party (O¨ VP). The latter included the future
chancellor Leopold Figl and the party’s general secretary (and later education
minister) Felix Hurdes. Despite their other fundamental differences in ideology
both groups shared an emphatic Austrian nationalist—or patriotic—sensibil-
ity, and many had also suffered persecution during the Nazi rule.99 Their align-
ment over denazification can be seen in several cabinet discussions of summer
97 This can now be followed up to February 11, 1947, in the published cabinet min-
utes of the Renner and Figl governments; Die Protokolle des Kabinettrates der Prov-
isorischen Regierung Karl Renner, ed. Gertrude Enderle-Burcel, Rudolf Jerˇa´bek, vol.
1 (Vienna, 1995), vol. 2 (Vienna, 2003), vol. 3 (Vienna, 2004); Die Protokolle des
Ministerrates der Zweiten Republik: Kabinett Leopold Figl I, vol. 1 (Vienna, 2004),
vol. 2 (Vienna, 2005), vol. 3 (Vienna, 2005), vol. 4 (Vienna, 2006).
98 Elizabeth Klamper, “‘Ein einig Volk von Bru¨dern’: Vergessen und Erinnern im
Zeichen des Burgfriedens,” Zeitgeschichte 24 (1997): 170–82.
99 This can be seen in the ambivalent admiration shown by the middle-class conser-
vative Josef Scho¨ner for Ernst Fischer in Josef Scho¨ner, Wiener Tagebuch, 1944/1945,
ed. Eva-Marie Csa´ky, Franz Matscher, and Gerald Stourzh (Vienna, 1992), 216, 236.
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1945. Together with the justice minister, Josef Gero¨ (a lawyer with no party
affiliation), they pressed for speedier and more vigorous denazification and
expressed growing frustration when this failed to happen.100
The Socialist leaders in the provisional government—above all Karl Renner
(chancellor and, from December 1945, Austria’s president), Adolf Scha¨rf
(party secretary and then vice-chancellor), and Oskar Helmer (state secretary,
then interior minister)—took the party in a new pragmatic direction that
contrasted with the traditional rhetoric of Austro-Marxism.101 For them the
pan-German revolution had been killed by the Anschluss, even though many
(including Renner) may still have mourned its passing and still found the
notion of an Austrian nation suspiciously reactionary.102 The new leadership
was also pragmatic on “the Nazi question.”103 Broadly speaking, they took the
view that the party could not afford to alienate working-class people and
intellectuals who had been recruited into the Nazi Party or the Hitler Youth;
they tended to see their motives as economic or instrumental and in that sense
excusable.104 Renner warned his fellow Socialists on more than one occasion
against rejecting these “very valuable” elements, especially since the People’s
Party enjoyed an established pool of activists from the Cartellverband.105
For both leadership and rank and file the dissolution of the party and trade
unions by Dollfuss in 1934 was still the prime grievance. The Anschluss was
often not seen in the same traumatic light, representing, in the words of Renner,
no more than a change from “Mussolini-fascism” to “Hitler-fascism.”106 Ren-
ner and his ministerial colleagues also often appear to have had little appreciation
of the murderous dimensions of Nazi racial policy. In some cases (notably that
of Oskar Helmer) they held antisemitic views. At any rate they were reluctant
100 Robert Knight, ed., “Ich bin dafu¨r, die Sache in die La¨nge zu ziehen”: Die Wort-
protokolle der o¨sterreichischen Bundesregierung von 1945 bis 1952 u¨ber die Entscha¨-
digung der Juden, 2nd ed. (Vienna, 2000), 73, 85; Bailer-Galanda, Entstehung, 20–34.
101 Kurt Shell, The Transformation of Austrian Socialism (New York, 1962).
102 See Peter Thaler, The Ambivalence of Identity: The Austrian Experience of Nation-
Building in a Modern Society, Central European Studies (West Lafayette, IN, 2001),
114–16; also Robert Knight, “Education and Identity in Austria after the Second World
War,” in The Habsburg Legacy: National Identity in Historical Perspective, ed. Ritchie
Robertson and Edward Timms, Austrian Studies, vol. 5 (Edinburgh, 1994), 178–95.
103 Karl Stadler, Adolf Scha¨rf, Mensch—Politiker—Staatsmann (Vienna, 1982), is
generally uncritical; Wilhelm Svoboda, Die Partei, die Republik und der Mann mit den
vielen Gesichtern: Oskar Helmer und O¨ sterreich II; eine Korrektur (Vienna, 1993) is
iconoclastic.
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to allow Jewish comrades, and potential rivals, to return from exile. It is strik-
ing how swift they were to express indignation about the allegedly arbitrary
and unjust treatment meted out to former Nazis, comparing it (unfavorably)
to Nazi policy even at a point when very few judgments had yet been handed
down.107
Separating “serious” from “nominal” Nazis has often been seen, wrongly,
as some kind of key that policy makers failed, through stupidity or blindness,
to use to unlock the door to effective denazification. In fact that separation
was the declared aim of all three parties. The Communist leader Ernst Fischer,
for example, made no secret of the Communist desire to target those he con-
sidered misled or confused ordinary party members.108 But he also stressed the
need to punish the “hangmen, murderers, and bandits” who had committed
crimes.109 This points to an important distinction. For Communist and (some)
People’s Party leaders the notional separation between sheep and goats was to
be a preliminary step toward punishing the latter, while for SPO¨ ministers it
was the reintegration of the sheep that appeared to be the paramount goal.
On paper, the first denazification laws of the provisional government were
punitive measures aimed at dealing with the complexity of the Nazi state and
party organization. The Prohibition Law (Verbotsgesetz) sought to separate out
more serious Nazis on the basis of activity in the illegal pre-Anschluss Nazi
Party, which was described as high treason, as well as on the basis of mem-
bership in the Schutzstaffel (SS) and paramilitary formations.110 As a first step
all members of the party (including “candidate members” or Anwa¨rter) and its
ancillary organizations were to be registered. More serious Nazis were then to
be subject to a range of penalties including imprisonment, dismissal with loss
of pension rights, loss of property, and fines. Criminal activity was to be tried
under the terms of the War Crimes Law (Kriegsverbrechergesetz), which set
up a system of People’s Courts.111
107 See, e.g., Helmer in Kabinettsratsprotokoll (KRP) 14th session, June 26, 1945,
Renner Protokolle, 1:309; Svoboda, Helmer, 49–51ff.; or (on Renner) Maria Mesner,
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However, the denazification law was undermined from the start by the de-
cision to allow appeals and exemptions not merely from punishment but even
from the preliminary registration.112 Clemency (Nachsicht) could be granted if
an individual could show that he or she “had never misused his or her mem-
bership in the NSDAP or one of its paramilitary organizations (SA, NSKK,
NSFK) and if a positive attitude toward the Austrian Republic can be deduced
with certainty from his or her behavior before the liberation of Austria.”113 As
the diplomat Josef Scho¨ner put it in his diary, the law would satisfy the vox
populi while Article 27 would deal with “the necessary Rennerish exceptions
and pardons.”114 But the coup de graˆce for the law came when this loophole
was made available to everyone liable to registration. That decision, whose
significance has generally been overlooked, resulted in a flood of applications
that placed the skeletal administration in Vienna under an unbearable strain.115
Soon afterward Adolf Scha¨rf stated that the mistake had made the law
“unwieldy” to enforce.116 On June 19, Renner reported that applications for
exemptions were “mounting up.”117 By the end of the summer, laws, decrees,
and amendments had proliferated, but the confusion had not lessened.118
By October, eighty-five thousand out of ninety thousand Nazis liable for
26, 1945; see Claudia Kuretsedis-Haider, “Volksgerichtsbarkeit und Entnazifizierung
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14–23; Stiefel, Entnazifizierung, chap. 3.
113
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hibition Law/Verbotsgesetz (StGBl. 13), May 8, 1945; NS Registrierungsverordnung
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registration (in Vienna and eastern Austria) had applied for exemption. So long
as their appeals were pending no further provisions could be enacted.119 In
addition to lobbying within the nascent state there was intense informal lob-
bying, notably within the new political parties.120 In short, the first federal
attempt at denazification was stopped in its tracks after only a few months not,
as was later claimed, because it had abandoned the juridical principle of in-
dividual treatment but because it had applied that principle too widely.
Meanwhile the political context was changing. In September 1945 the Four
Power Allied Commission for Austria was set up, bringing substantial Western
military bureaucracies to Vienna; at the end of October the commission gave
the Renner government (qualified) recognition; a month earlier the first of three
provincial conferences had met in Vienna and, after some reduction in the
Communist role and inclusion of more Western provincial representation, it
had recognized the provisional government; on November 26 general elections
were held in which the Communist party was decimated (gaining only 5.4
percent of the national vote).
These changes brought two opposing pressures to bear on federal denazi-
fication. Broadly speaking, the Allies pushed for more action while the party
organizations, especially in the provinces, called for less. Allied pressure for
“an active, sustained and determined struggle” against the remnants of Nazism
and its supporters arose from the short-lived coincidence of Soviet dissatis-
faction with the new Austrian government, on the one hand, and U.S. ambi-
tions to extend the scope of denazification, on the other.121 The earlier Soviet
laissez-faire approach to the Renner state government had not amounted to an
endorsement of the denazification, but neither had there been any consistent
Soviet pressure on the government to change it. After the Communist election
defeat this changed, and a series of frontal attacks on the state of denazification
followed.122 At the same time the U.S. officials and military who now arrived
schaftssa¨uberungsgesetz (StGBl. 160), September 12, 1945; 1., 2. NS Registrierungs-
verordnung (StGBl. 40), June 30, 1945; 3. Durchfu¨hrungsverordnung zum Verbots-
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1945–1995,” in Die Organisation der o¨sterreichischen Sozialdemokratie 1889–1995,
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on the scene were not merely still committed to the Fragebogen system but
also, as in Germany, keen to extend it.123 At the end of the year Allied bodies
began to express dissatisfaction with the number of former Nazi Party members
still working as senior civil servants, and a quadripartite Denazification Office
began to press the government to dismiss them. The central ministries were
scrutinized and instructed to dismiss officials deemed unacceptable; minis-
ters—up to and including the chancellor—were summoned to account by the
Allied Council. This pressure gained a foreign policy dimension when the
Soviet government cited the inadequacy of Austrian denazification to block
discussions on an Austrian treaty in April 1946.124
Pressure in the other direction increased as both government and parties
extended their authority from eastern Austria to the rest of the country. Within
the O¨ VP, federal structures brought provincial pressure to restrict purges and
an early setback for pronounced anti-Nazi ministers like Figl, Hurdes, and
Alois Weinberger. It soon became clear that the latters’ attitudes were tougher
than those they wished to attract as members or voters.125
The SPO¨ position was almost a mirror image of this. The Viennese party,
which had always been important but was even more so in the limited area of
the provisional government, was in general further to the left than the prag-
matic leadership of Renner and Helmer, favoring a continued class struggle
and rejecting a coalition with the People’s Party in terms that differed little
from those of the Communists.126 This left-wing stance broadly mapped onto
a tougher line concerning the “Nazi question,” including the rejection of the
recruitment of former Nazis. Viennese Socialists like Paul Speiser (deputy
mayor of Vienna) and Bruno Marek (later mayor) also strongly disagreed with
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the proposal to give “less serious” Nazis the vote, Marek calling the proposal
a “slap in the face for concentration camp victims and prisoners.” By contrast,
Socialists outside Vienna tended to support the demand by the “pragmatists”
for a softening of the conditions of recruitment into the party. After a series
of clashes in August and September within the party Vorstand (the executive
committee), the Viennese line initially won out.127
In the end it was Allied objections (as well as administrative difficulties)
that were decisive in excluding former Nazi Party members from the franchise
in Austria’s first elections. Even though the extent to which the exclusion was
actually enforced remains unclear, SPO¨ provincial organizations clearly felt
that they had lost votes because of the party’s tough line.128 As one delegate
to the party’s first national conference in December put it: “Where we spoke
about the Nazi problem we were met by an icy chill, but when we stressed the
positive side of the party the masses joined us enthusiastically.” Though others
pointed to the dangers to the party of admitting, for example, members of the
Hitler Youth without intensive party education, the Viennese line was begin-
ning to soften.129
Revisions to the denazification law to accommodate these provincial views
were now also under discussion. One proposal of the provincial conference
aimed at getting out of the morass of deregistration by excluding relatively
harmless ancillary groups (for example, NSFK) en bloc. The revised law also
corrected the earlier flaw in Article 27; the right of appeal (to be decided by
the newly elected President Renner) was now to be limited to “more incrim-
inated” Nazis. But, as Weinberger noted in a cabinet meeting, the real problem
was that Nazis with connections—whatever their culpability—could deploy
networks of supporters and economic resources in applying for exemptions.130
The revised law would not change that. As Minister of Justice Gero¨ com-
plained, it still allowed both exemptions (by tripartite special commissions)
and appeals to the provincial governor (Landeshauptmann). It was hard to see
how this would stop the development of what Gero¨ called “a whole complaints
industry [eine ganze Industrie von Beschwerden]” or stop former Nazis im-
plementing their slogan: “misuse democratic instruments to the point where
they become a laughingstock.”131
127 Mesner, “Die Unwa¨gbarkeiten,” in her Entnazifierung, 64–65; for the mayor of
Linz, Ernst Koref, Neugebauer and Schwarz, BSA, 45–47; Renner Protokolle, 3:
106–7.
128 On the lack of clarity, see Galanda, Entstehung, 46.
129 SPO¨ , Parteitag 1945: 14. und 15. Dezember 1945 (Vienna, 1946), 92; Neugebauer
and Schwarz, BSA, 48–49; Mesner, “Die Unwa¨gbarkeiten,” 58–76, 71–72; Doris Sot-
topietra and Maria Wirth, “Die La¨nderebene der SPO¨ ,” in Mesner, Entnazifizierung,
77–145, 95–96.
130 KRP 33rd session, October 3, 1945, Renner Protokolle, 3:99–103 (Altmann).
131 KRP 37th session, November 6, 1945, Renner Protokolle, 3:220–23; KRP 38th
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Further revisions were discussed within the newly elected government. Hel-
mer argued for the Nazi question “finally to be removed from the agenda”
since the mass of former Nazis no longer posed a threat. Once it was gone, he
thought the government should make an official declaration of reconciliation.
For Helmer, as for much of the media, “the Nazi question” now meant the
question of how best to wind up denazification. Those who still saw denazi-
fication as a way of punishing or excluding Nazi wrongdoers were finding it
increasingly difficult to say how this should be done. It is an indication of this
growing bewilderment that Hurdes now came close to throwing overboard the
whole basis on which denazification had hitherto been discussed, suggesting
that the registration that was about to be started in the western provinces should
not be comprehensive but limited from the start to the more serious cases;
otherwise, “there too a mountain of files will pile up, which no one knows
how to deal with.”132 The idea was not pursued. Instead, the three parties started
negotiations and at the end of March reached agreement. Together with a
revised tariff of penalties, the new proposal recommended a basic division
between “incriminated” and “less incriminated” Nazis, with less stress placed
on membership in the Nazi Party when it had been illegal as a criterion for
the former.133 Presenting the proposal to the cabinet, Hurdes reviewed the
reasons for the failure of denazification since the end of the Third Reich. The
fundamental mistake, he thought, had been to allow individual deregistration
for everyone. This had been misused by the vast majority of those affected
and in combination with patronage and string pulling had paralyzed the law.
It was now to be blocked by restricting deregistration to a very few specified
groups.134 However, since the new law still contained provisions to apply for
exemptions and appeals, it was unclear what would now cause the practices
Hurdes criticized to cease. The views expressed in the parliamentary debate
on the law suggested, to the contrary, that the political atmosphere was be-
coming more favorable for them. Spokesmen of both main parties expressed—
with different emphases—sympathy for the “small” party members. From the
media and from Catholic bishops alike came appeals for clemency for those
in Allied internment camps.135
session, November 16, 1946, Renner Protokolle, 3:257–58; Stiefel, Entnazifizierung,
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132 MRP, 5th session, January 29, 1946, and MRP 7th session, February 5, 1946,
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133 MRP 23rd session, June 4, 1946, Ministerrat Figl I, 2:186–87.
134 MRP 25th session, June 12, 1946, Ministerrat Figl I, 2:249–50; Beilage (Erla¨u-
ternde Bemerkungen zum Nationalsozialistengesetz), O¨ StA, AdR; Stiefel, Entnazifizi-
erung, 101–2, 104; Garscha and Kuretsedis-Haider, “Nachkriegsjustiz,” 858–59.
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While adapting its policies to these pressures from outside Vienna, the gov-
ernment also moved to placate the Allies. Chancellor Figl set up—without
parliamentary discussion or legislative backing—a Ministerial Denazification
Committee (“Figl Committee”) to implement a swift nonbureaucratic purge of
the higher echelons of the federal and provincial civil service (encompassing
Dienstgrad I–III, i.e., from Regierungsrat upward). Figl told his ministers that
the committee’s target was “not the small people but the big shots.” Those
who had been intellectual leaders were “to be removed from public service
and the complete administration of the state and the province.” He stressed
that it was “essential to create the right sort of atmosphere toward the Allied
Council, which is required for us to attain a real restoration of a free and
independent Austria.”136 Figl also dismissed the argument (put forward by the
minister of trade and reconstruction) that purges were threatening some who
were indispensable: “We’ve already seen how thousands of Nazis were thrown
out overnight and things still carried on. Today everyone claims they were
innocent.”137 Figl’s initiative was welcomed by the Allies, but their pressure
did not immediately lessen. At the start of March, Figl described the whole
“Nazi question” as “impossible to unravel” (unentwirrbar).138
The knot was not unraveled, but, as Allied pressure lessened, its political
impact was neutralized. As we have already seen, the British had in any case
always been ambivalent about a widespread purge. The hostility of the British
Legal Division toward such a policy even led them to consider intervening to
soften the impact of the Austrian legislation on “nominal” Nazis, and they
wondered if the policy might have been framed “in order to placate the Al-
lies [sic].”139 Perhaps not surprisingly, the minister of justice concluded that
the demands of the Allied Council to dismiss more judges and prosecutors,
which developed into a major bone of contention in the spring, were mere
“shadow boxing” (Spiegelfechterei).140 By the end of the year the British au-
thorities had redefined their role in quadripartite committees as being to “en-
sure that no unnecessary denazification is carried out.”141 Most important, U.S.
policy also shifted away from radical denazification. In the second half of 1946
136 MRP 4th session, January 22, 1946, Ministerrat Figl I, 1:71–72. See also Wilfried
Kos, “Entnazifizerung der Bu¨rokratie,” in Meissl, Mulley, and Rathkolb, Verdra¨ngte
Schuld, 65–67; Stiefel, Entnazifizierung, 132–35.
137 MRP 6th session, January 30, 1946, Ministerrat Figl I, 1:144; see also MRP 7th
session, February 5, 1946, Ministerrat Figl I, 1:177–78.
138 MRP 12th session, March 12, 1946, Ministerrat Figl I, 1:321.
139 Note to Deputy Commissioner on Denazification Policy, n.d., PRO, FO1020/353/
43A.
140 MRP 4th session, January 14, 1946, Ministerrat Figl I, 1:74.
141 Vienna (ACABE) to Control Office (“Denazification: Future British Policy”),
March 1, 1947, PRO, FO945/787.
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the Moscow Declaration was “reframed,” so that its punitive side, which had
fed into denazification, was displaced by its commitment to restore indepen-
dence and sovereignty. In October the State Department declared that it con-
sidered Austria to be a liberated country. In this new perspective, any criticism
of Austrian denazification appeared to be playing into Soviet hands.142
At the end of July the chancellor gave the Allied Council a detailed report
on the progress of denazification. Despite private skepticism about the validity
of his statistics the West praised the government’s achievements.143 Admittedly,
the Austrian denazification law (now in its third incarnation) was considerably
sharpened by the Allies in the second half of 1946, but this was not due to
any rediscovered unity. The fifty-five amendments, nearly all of them proposed
by the Soviet element (and the French), were simply accepted by the United
States and the British occupiers in order to allow the issue to be defused. Once
the law was passed it could be removed from the international agenda. As for
its actual implementation, the law allowed plenty of scope for the application
of what one British legal official called “sagacious negligence.”144
The Austrian parliament passed the law under protest in February 1947.145
Its draconian provisions prompted an outburst of indignation from most quar-
ters of Austrian public life. But the outburst was actually the best indication
that the letter of the law was unlikely to be enforced.146 The argument against
excluding a large body of citizens from civil life was rehearsed again, by
church leaders, politicians, and President Renner.147 But their case was much
more than a functionalist or utilitarian one: it was couched in the language of
compassion and forgiveness. A prominent example was the attack on the new
law by the head of state, President Karl Renner. He rejected the idea of “os-
tracism” both on moral and practical grounds.148 It is worth noting that it was
not Renner’s stance that had changed since 1945 but the context. Instead of
having to argue against strong objections both within his own party, the SPO¨ ,
142 John Erhardt (U.S. minister, Vienna) to Secretary of State, November 27, 1946,
Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, 1969), 5:380; Bischof, Austria in
the First Cold War, 78–79; Rathkolb, “US-Entnazifizierung,” 315; Tweraser, “Ameri-
kanische Sa¨uberungspolitik,” 380–91; Stiefel, Entnazifizierung, 44.
143 Allied Council/Minutes (ALCO/M) (46) 27th meeting, July 26, 1946, U.S. State
Department, Historical Division, Minutes and Papers of the Allied Commission for
Austria, microfilm (Washington, 1958–60); MRP, 34th session, July 30, 1946, Minis-
terrat Figl I, vol. 3, 79–80.
144 Deputy Commissioner’s Conference, January 22, 1947, PRO, FO1007/267.
145 Stenographische Protokolle des Nationalrates, 44th Parliamentary Sitting, Fifth
Legislative Period, February 6, 1947, cols. 1213–16; Stiefel, Entnazifizierung, 105–
13; Bailer-Galanda, Entstehung, 116–18.
146 See Stiefel, Entnazifizierung, 113–14.
147 See MRP 53rd session, January 21, 1947, Ministerrat Figl I, 4:321.
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and within his government, his position was now in the mainstream; his critics
were either marginalized or on the defensive. Chancellor Figl himself was a
prime example. He had indeed shifted and was no longer urging action against
Nazi wrongdoers (including those who had imprisoned him after the An-
schluss), as he had in summer 1945, but merely making the tactical case that
the denazification law should be accepted as a disagreeable necessity that
would “prevent the State Treaty foundering on the Nazi question.”149
Once the measure became law, the path to a party-based reintegration was
open. It was clear that Renner himself would have no inhibitions about using
his rights under Article 27 to grant clemency. The main question was how the
wishes of ministers and parties should be coordinated. As Helmer put it: “I
imagine that each party . . . will have its people where a special interest is
involved. If we decide that the parties can present their applications to the
Minister of the Interior, they can be checked there, the questionnaires can be
returned, and a referral to the president can follow.” Helmer proposed fixing
a quota for each party, and this was the basis of the reintegration of first the
“less incriminated” and later the “incriminated” Nazis that followed. Four
years later Helmer recalled that it had been agreed that each party (including
the Communists) would put forward its “house Nazis” to be granted clemency
by the president under the terms of Article 27. By 1951 the original quotas of
a few hundred had grown into “tens of thousands.”150
V. DENAZIFICATION BETWEEN CARINTHIA AND VIENNA
Federal denazification had to accommodate pressures from the provinces. But
at least in the Carinthian case provincial governments could also appear anx-
ious to stay in line with Vienna. This was true even in the summer of 1945
when the British had officially barred them from having any contacts with the
Renner government. Though there was little sign of hostility to the capital,
there is also little evidence for “love at second sight.”151 While federal politi-
cians did not feel they could take the loyalty of the province for granted,
Carinthian politicians were probably aware that the way they had taken over
from the Nazi regime left them vulnerable. Attacks from the Yugoslav gov-
149 MRP 53rd session, January 21, 1947, Ministerrat Figl I, 4:321; Bailer-Galanda, En-
tstehung, 117; Bailer-Galanda and Garscha, “Der osterreichische Staatsvertrag,” 634–35.
150 MRP 58th session, February 25, 1947, 245th Session, April 24, 1951, O¨ stA, AdR;
Bailer-Galanda, Entstehung, 157–60, 218.
151 Robert Kriechbaumer, “Liebe auf den zweiten Blick: Die La¨nder und der Bund
1945: Zu Vorgeschichte und Geschichte der La¨nderkonferenz, 1945,” in Liebe auf den
Zweiten Blick: Landes- und O¨ sterreichbewußtsein nach 1945, ed. Robert Kriechbau-
mer, Geschichte der o¨sterreichischen Bundesla¨nder seit 1945, vol. 6 (Vienna, 1998),
15–46.
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ernment, the Slovene Liberation Front (Osvobodilna Fronta) or even Soviet
Radio in Vienna might be discounted.152 But criticism from within the federal
government must have seemed more serious. At the end of May, a three-man
delegation arrived from the capital intending to take over power in the prov-
ince. The attempt was initiated, or at least approved, by two state secretaries
in Renner’s government, the Communist Franz Honner (who had fought with
the Yugoslav partisans) and the Catholic Raoul Bumballa.153 Its clear purpose
was to remove what Honner called scathingly “a government that had been
formed under the patronage of the old regime.”154 Piesch’s designated succes-
sor as governor was Otto Zhuber, a former official in the Vaterla¨ndische Front
who had been imprisoned in Dachau before joining Honner’s “Austrian bat-
talions” and fighting under Yugoslav partisan command.155 Before leaving Vi-
enna on May 22, Zhuber told Josef Scho¨ner that he intended to “create order
in the shortest possible time, even if he had to start off by arresting 1–3,000
people. He would not hesitate to treat the Nazis exactly as they had acted in
1938 and to imprison all the incorrigible ones in camps.”156 However, the
“coup” quickly fizzled out, largely because the British authorities backed
Piesch.157 But even if it had succeeded Zhuber would have been faced by the
difficulty of implementing his radical denazification program; as described by
Scho¨ner, the problem was how to find enough “suitable people” in a province
where “nearly everyone was in the party.”158
It is likely that it was this incident that led the Carinthian government to
introduce its own denazification law for the civil service soon after. As with a
further proposal in July, it closely followed the wording of the federal legis-
lation.159 Among amendments “appropriate for the Carinthian situation” was
152 See the report of a broadcast from Soviet-controlled Vienna radio, “Danger over
Zone Muddle in Austria,” Observer, May 13, 1945; Fran Zwitter, To Destroy Nazism
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12, 27–30, 64–69.
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in englischer Originalfassung (Vienna, 1985), 176; biographical note in Renner Pro-
tokolle, 3:493.
154 KRP 8th session, May 22, 1945, Renner Protokolle, 1:111.
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“Gesetz u¨ber die Reinigung der Beamtenschaft und sonstiger Stellen von Nation-
Denazification and Integration in Carinthia 605
the possibility of exemption for those who had joined the SS “under the pres-
sure of mental force and blackmail.” Exemptions were to be decided in Kla-
genfurt, however, not in Vienna.160
As contacts with the capital improved, criticism continued. When Honner
came to Carinthia he complained about the numbers of Nazi gendarmes and
police still in office and the “profascist attitude of numerous district com-
manders.”161 Criticism came as well from Ferdinand Graf, O¨ VP state secretary
for the interior, who was also a leading Carinthian landowner and former
official of the Vaterla¨ndische Front.162 He expressed “surprise” when he came
to Carinthia at the start of September to see that well-known Nazis were still
at liberty.163 This was the first of several attacks by Graf on former illegal
Nazis, whom he described as traitors to Austria, and on the failure of the
Carinthian authorities (and by implication the British) to deal with them. The
party political element in his attacks was shown in attacks on university-edu-
cated Nazis (Akademiker) who had promptly changed “from brown to another
color.”164 The color he had in mind was clearly red.
By the end of 1945 it was becoming clear that metropolitan criticism of the
Carinthian situation came from only one segment of the political spectrum.
Renner himself was ready to take at face value the Carinthian assertion that
the province had mounted a successful resistance movement.165 And after their
election victory in the province it presumably became more difficult for the
SPO¨ leadership to criticize conditions there. Nevertheless, even here there is
some evidence of concern. Helmer reported to his ministerial colleagues that
“things are emerging that make an intervention absolutely essential.”166 It
seems, however, that he was primarily worried about those who refused to be
“reconciled” to the new Austria—that is, those who were drawn to neo-Nazi
or “Werewolf” conspiracies.167 Those who were ready to be integrated by join-
alsozialisten,” PKLR 1, 10th session, May 26, 1945, KLA, LAD. Wilhelm Wadl’s
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ing the SPO¨ were apparently less of a concern. Although the SPO¨ Central
Committee was reportedly worried about the protection of Nazis in the Car-
inthian party and “Piesch’s name was mentioned in this connection,” recruit-
ment continued.168 A year after he had called for a root-and-branch purge of
the teaching profession, Piesch was complaining that the purge of teachers had
gone much too far.169 Before long the Carinthian SPO¨ would be seeking credit
from the electorate for having restricted the scope of denazification.
When the “Figl committee” arrived in the provinces to review senior ap-
pointments in the public sector it was not welcome, as Landesamtsdirektor
Karl Newole, who had been instrumental in previous personnel decisions,
made clear. In public he made the case that any future purges should concen-
trate on private industry.170 Within the provincial government he forecast dire
consequences for the provincial administration “if experienced senior officials
are removed.”171 His warnings were followed by similar comments from those
in charge of other key sectors of the civil service, such as the police (and
gendarmerie).172 The future of district administrators (Bezirkshauptleute) was
particularly controversial and led to a tug-of-war between capital and province.
Some were pensioned off, others transferred to less conspicuous positions, but
in the end a bargain was struck based on party parity, the seven posts being
distributed to the two main parties in a ratio of 3:3 (with the Klagenfurt position
going to a nonparty candidate).173
The new federal legislation clearly did not usher in a new chapter in dena-
zification, as some, including the head of Carinthian security, anticipated.174
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The procedure for the mass of members followed the established pattern: reg-
istration between February and July 1946 of over forty-five thousand Nazi
members and applicant members, coupled with applications for exemption (by
about 80 percent of them.)175 As for the more serious cases, some were now
released from British internment and thus in theory came within the reach of
the People’s Court in Klagenfurt (a Senat of the Graz People’s Court). The
first case was a high-profile “euthanasia” trial of doctors and nurses at Kla-
genfurt Hospital. It ended—not without controversy—in guilty verdicts and
death sentences for Franz Niedermoser and two of his assistants.176 Further
prosecutions followed but they faced various difficulties. Some of these were
practical—for example, shortage of manpower and prison space.177 Others
were legal and political: Austrian prosecutors had to observe due process in a
way the British military did not.178 Nor could the justice minister intervene
when he considered the verdicts of the People’s Courts to be too mild.179 But
the justice system was also more open to the political influence of local elites,
as was shown in the case of two prominent timber magnates, Adolf Funder
and Franz Hasslacher, who successfully evaded prosecution.180 In the case of
another local bigwig, Robert Rapatz, who was president of the Chamber of
Industry (Wirtschaftskammer) and sat on the provincial denazification com-
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(Entnazifizierung, 98) cites a figure of 46,753 contained in a report by the Interior
Ministry to the Allied Council (Bundesministerium fu¨r Inneres, U¨ berblick u¨ber regis-
trierte Nationalsozialisten, September 15, 1946). However, by failing to distinguish be-
tween full and candidate members (Anwa¨rter) he radically overestimates the effectiveness
of registration; Volkszeitung, March 3, 1946. Wadl, “Entnazifizierung,” 257, notes 37,398
requests for clemency out of forty-five thousand registered in February 1946.
176 Niedermoser was found guilty of killing of at least four hundred adults and chil-
dren in his charge. See Helga Stromberger, Die A¨ rzte, die Schwestern die SS und der
Tod (Klagenfurt, 1988), 55; Ernst Klee, Was sie taten—was sie wurden: A¨ rzte, Juristen
und anderen Beteiligte am Kranken- oder Judenmord (Frankfurt am Main, 1987), 325–
26; Elste, Koschat, and Filipicˇ, NS-O¨ sterreich, 55–56.
177 Garscha, “Entnazifizierung,” esp. 861–77.
178 See House of Commons, Estimates Committee, Report of Subcommittee F (Lon-
don, 1946), para. 358.
179 MRP 32nd session, July 17, 1946, O¨ StA, AdR (Gero¨), Ministerrat Figl I, vol. 3,
26–27.
180 On Funder’s timber and chipboard firm, see Stefan Karner, Ka¨rntens Wirtschaft,
1938–1945: Mit einem Vorwort von Albert Speer (Klagenfurt, 1976), 266; Elste and
Ha¨nisch, Auf dem Weg, 280, 292; Wadl, “Entnazifizierung,” 260–61. Hasslacher had
been a leading Austrian banker (president of the Creditanstalt): see Elste, Braune Elite,
156 n. 679; Elste and Ha¨nisch, Auf dem Weg, 304; Ulrike Felber, Peter Melichar, Markus
Priller, Berthold Unfried, and Fritz Weber, O¨ konomie der Arisierung, part 2, Wirt-
schaftssektoren, Branchen, Falldarstellungen, Vero¨ffentlichungen der O¨ sterreichischen
Historikerkommision, vol. 10 (Vienna, 2004), 517–20, 540; “Verhaftung von Nation-
alsozialisten,” Wiener Zeitung, February 9, 1946.
608 Knight
mittee, even a combination of pressure from the federal Chancellery, the Brit-
ish, and the Carinthian SPO¨ could not offset the political support he had from
the Carinthian People’s Party. Rapatz remained in office, though he did resign
from the denazification committee. He later sat in the upper chamber of par-
liament (the Bundesrat) for the People’s Party.181
In the second half of 1946 the remaining impetus from the People’s Party
was dissipated. Graf continued to complain about the continued activities of
former Nazis, including illegals, in the municipal administration of Villach.182
Yet before long he had shifted to a stance of solidarity with the Heimat in the
border struggle, proclaiming that “all of Austria stands by Carinthia.”183 The
historical legacy or mythology of the endangered province clearly caused min-
isters to feel they had to demonstrate the government’s support. Graf and
Helmer both stressed that the mistakes made after the end of the First World
War had to be avoided so that the Carinthians “can’t say that in Vienna the
government doesn’t care about these matters and then they can’t also claim
that they have to protect themselves as in 1918–19.”184 Under these circum-
stances, criticizing Carinthian denazification appeared inappropriate. Soon the
Carinthian People’s Party began to try to outflank the SPO¨ on the “national
question.” That meant not merely resisting Yugoslav territorial claims but in-
creasingly also attacking Slovene educational rights.185 This campaign was
orchestrated by the hero of the “defensive struggle” and veteran German na-
tional activist Hans Steinacher. He argued that the defense of the Carinthian
Heimat had been seriously weakened by denazification, and he called for it to
be dismantled.186
The forced resignation of Carinthia’s governor, Hans Piesch, in March 1947
provides a snapshot of the state of denazification in Carinthia nearly two years
after the end of the Third Reich. The level of Piesch’s complicity with National
Socialism is less important here than the reasons for, and responses to, his
case. Piesch resigned because his activities in support of the Third Reich had
181 Rapatz had been an illegal Nazi member and town master builder (Stadtbaumeister)
in Klagenfurt. See Political Reports for July, September, and November 1946, PRO,
FO1007/335; Political Intelligence Department (PID) Austrian personalities 48, PRO,
FO1007/337; “Konstituierung der Kammer,” Ka¨rntner Wirtschaft, December 15, 1946.
182
“Massenversammlung von Vertrauenspersonen,” Volkszeitung, March 17, 1946;
Graf to Figl, April 26, 1946, Bundesministerium fu¨r Inneres (BMI), AdR, BKA, Ent-
nazifizierung, box 22. See “Landesparteitag,” Volkszeitung, September 22, 1946. See
also Neugebauer and Schwarz, BSA, 93–94.
183 Ferdinand Graf, “Ganz O¨ sterreich steht zu Ka¨rnten,” Volkszeitung, May 1, 1947.
See Knight, “Ethnicity and Identity.”
184 MRP Figl I, 57th session, February 18, 1947, AdR, O¨ StA.
185 See Binder, “Rettung.”
186 Steinacher memorandum (“Kritische politische Wertung der Schulfrage in Su¨d-
ka¨rnten samt Folgerungen”), May 6, 1949, O¨ stA, AdR, BKA AA, pol/49, Staatsvertrag
2c/80.797–83.944.
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exposed him to Yugoslav attacks at a politically sensitive time. Without this
international imperative to demonstrate that Austria was “clean” he might well
have remained in office. This was certainly the view of his party leader, Vice-
Chancellor Scha¨rf, who was nonchalant about what he called Piesch’s “mild
show of collaboration,” seeing it as the only alternative to Dachau, military
service or death.187 More striking perhaps was the attitude of Chancellor Figl
to the SPO¨ ’s embarrassment. Though he called the revelation a “dirty busi-
ness,” he also “hoped that it would not become public knowledge.” That it did
not must itself be ascribed in large part to the O¨ VP’s restraint in not allowing
the details of the affair to become public. The Carinthian People’s Party also
showed restraint, its leader stressing within the provincial government that his
party had had nothing to do with the “witch hunt” (Kesseltreiben) against
Piesch. The People’s Party newspaper suggested that the SPO¨ had merely
reaped what they themselves had sown with their attacks on Rapatz. The in-
vitation to exercise mutual restraint in future was clear enough.188 As for the
British, Piesch’s resignation clearly called into question both the decisions they
had made in the first few weeks of occupation and, indeed, their current stance
of laissez-faire. The British minister in Vienna, William Mack, who two years
before had described Piesch as “universally recognized as a reliable anti-Nazi,”
was now astonished that “this information [about Piesch’s past] had not been
available earlier.”189 The Foreign Office was concerned about Scha¨rf’s attitude
and wondered if its previous assumption that the Austrian authorities would
“prevent Nazis from obtaining senior posts in the Government service” was
correct. Mack responded that he could not guarantee that “no more Piesches
[sic]” would be found but that it was “not possible for the intelligence Orga-
nisations at any rate at this stage of the occupation to probe into the records
of politicians and officials.”190
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has examined the assumptions, goals, and strategies of the main
actors involved in Carinthian denazification. What conclusions can be drawn
about the quality of the democracy that emerged from it? Five are offered here.
187 Scha¨rf told Mack that he did not blame those who decided on some form of
collaboration, and he thought that “Herr Piesch could return to the office that he had
vacated after the occupation.” Mack to Bevin, March 14, 1947, PRO, FO371/63958/
C4437. For similar exonerations see Berg, “Die SPO¨ ,” 164–66.
188 KLR 55th session, March 12, 1947, KLA, LAD; “Landeshauptmann Piesch zu¨-
ru¨ckgetreten,” Volkszeitung, March 13, 1947.
189 Mack to Pol. Div., June 6, 1945, PRO, FO371/46649/C3322; Mack to Bevin,
March 14, 1947, PRO, FO371/63958/C4437.
190 Burrows to Mack, April 12, 1947, PRO, FO371/63958/C4437; Mack to Burrows,
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First, the self-critical reflection on Nazi criminality that Helmut Dubiel sees
as a central democratic goal for a post-Nazi society was as conspicuously absent
in Carinthia as in West Germany. The national dimension, Austria’s questionable
legitimation as “the first victim of Hitlerite Aggression,” is of course well known.
To see this as an act of united evasion—whether reprehensible or unavoidable—
is misleading since, as has been shown, sections of Austria’s postwar elites did
in fact push for the punishment and exclusion of wrongdoers. However, in the
course of the first two postwar years they were either politically marginalized
or became resigned to what appeared an unavoidable failure. As early as the
summer of 1945 it became clear that the intended objects of purges could still
deploy enough resources to undermine, delay, and in the end reverse the mea-
sures aimed at them. For this reason the distinction between a small number of
“big fish” and a mass of “small fry” that ran through the rhetoric of denazification
misses the point. There were fish of all sizes, many had plenty of water to swim
in, and plenty could hire good lawyers.
Second, this account of denazification and its failure tends to undermine the
notion of a “functionally necessary” reintegration. Naturally the claim that
most followers of National Socialism would at some point have to be given
full citizenship if Austrian (or German) society were to function is hard to
contradict as a general proposition. But integration was as much about values
as about the rationality of a “system” and cannot be separated from the nor-
mative terms under which it took place. In particular, the claim that those
returning were rigorously vetted and systematically taught or retaught demo-
cratic values is hard to sustain.191 Further research is clearly required, but the
converse possibility, which was raised by some contemporaries, also needs to
be considered: that those readmitted might themselves influence the organi-
zations and the society they joined, whether in the form of the kind of orga-
nized “permeation” seen in the West German Free Democratic Party (FDP) or
through more informal networks.192 Reintegration could then also mean a re-
habilitation that was more than an individual one and that extended if not to
the whole National Socialist project at least to aspects of it. The central ex-
ample in the Carinthian context is the steady shift of both parties away from
support of Slovene collective rights. Here “taking the wind out of German
national sails” might actually increase the momentum of those who believed
that Carinthia should become a purely German-speaking society.193
191 Here Matt Berg (“Die SPO¨ ”) seems to me overoptimistic about the rigor of SPO¨
vetting.
192 See the monthly report for the Carinthian Security Direction, December 1954
(Villach), O¨ stA, AdR, BMI, 30.000 2/54.
193 See, among others, Robert Knight, “Schule zwischen Zwang und Verantwortung:
Britische Besatzung, Ka¨rntner Politik und die slowenische Minderheit, 1945–1959,”
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Third, a selective or “discriminating” reintegration—one that would still
involve drawing a line against those guilty of serious misdeeds—would always
be difficult, since discrimination depended on the preexisting sensibility about
Nazi criminality that was far from firmly established. But what probably made
it impossible was the system of regulated competition and bargaining known
under the shorthand of Proporz. This helped turned reintegration into a free-
for-all in which nearly all sense of restraint disappeared. Some objections were
voiced within both parties but they received short shrift from the party lead-
ership.194 Here the “overarching elite consensus” and the top-down decision
making noted by students of Austria’s “consociational democracy” appear as
a system of wheeling and dealing. Arguably denazification also explains why
that system, for all its effectiveness in many areas, also contributed to pervasive
cynicism about Austrian public life. Forty years later it was still a characteristic
stance of the FPO¨ to castigate the hypocrisy of the two main parties and
question the genuineness of their “antifascism” by reference to their readiness
to bend the rules of denazification.
Fourth, Carinthia was reintegrated into the Austrian federal state far more
successfully than it had been into the First Republic, but the reintegration came
not through harmony but through often tense negotiation. For obvious reasons
the Anschluss was taboo. Nostalgia for it or identification with a Greater Ger-
many now had to be encoded, though in the case of the veterans’ commem-
oration the code was not hard to crack.195 While provincial resentment of the
capital clearly no longer had the political impetus that had existed in 1938, it
had hardly disappeared.196 The mythology of the Carinthian Heimat as a Ger-
man bulwark was largely shorn of any overt geopolitical message. But it con-
tinued to exert a powerful polarizing effect on provincial politics, above all in
relation to the Slovene minority. Helped by Yugoslavia’s policy of claiming
Carinthian territory, it meant that those Slovene speakers who were not pre-
pared to assimilate were considered actual or potential traitors. This is not to
deny that there were supporters of minority rights in both the SPO¨ and the
O¨ VP, but they were steadily placed on the defensive. The politics and rhetoric
in O¨ sterreich unter alliierter Besatzung, 1945–1955, ed. Alfred Ableitinger, Siegfried
Beer, and Eduard Staudinger (Vienna, 1999), 531–58; Svila Tributsch, “Der Konflikt
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195 Sieglinde Rosenberger and Reinhold Ga¨rtner, Kriegerdenkma¨ler (Innsbruck,
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of the Heimat provided the opponents of minority rights with a natural habitat.
At the annual October 10 celebrations the mythology of the Carinthian Heimat
was ritually reaffirmed. No space was allowed here for critical self-reflection
on the persecution of the Slovene minority, much less on the implication of
German nationalism in Nazi rule.197 After the brief postwar intervention phase
described in this article, national politicians generally accepted this Heimat
culture, whether out of a sense of weakness or because of electoral calculation.
Often they were ready to exploit it themselves.198
Fifth, the occupation authorities in Carinthia and elsewhere in Austria were
not interested or concerned enough to intervene seriously in its politics. Austria
did not receive its liberated status “on a platter,” as sometimes maintained, and
Allied denazification proceeded on a premise broadly similar to that applied
in Germany, but fewer resources were deployed. As the flaws of the policy
became clear, the occupiers sought to remedy them by involving Carinthian
elites; thus party politics moved to the center of denazification. The growing
confusion surrounding British policy was (thinly) veiled by the “high policy”
imperatives of handing over responsibility to the Austrian government and
defending it against Soviet (and Yugoslav) attacks. So long as the formal con-
ditions of democracy and the taboo on the Anschluss were observed, the oc-
cupation authorities saw no reason to change their laissez-faire stance. This
contrasts starkly with the monitoring and intervention in the early Federal
Republic of both the U.S. and British authorities, whose role in setting nor-
mative limits (Grenzmarkierung) has been stressed by Norbert Frei and oth-
ers.199 Apart from occasional journalistic forays, the quality of the democratic
culture in Austrian provinces was not an issue for the outside world, and it did
not become one for another forty years.200
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